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When evaluating whether to sue, prosecute, settle, or plead, trial lawyers 
must predict the future—they need to estimate how likely they are to win a 
given case in a given jurisdiction.  Social scientists have used mock juror 
studies to produce a vast body of literature showing how different variables 
influence juror decision-making.  But few of these studies account for jury 
deliberation, so they present an impoverished picture of how these effects 
play out in trials and are of limited usefulness. 
This Article helps lawyers better predict the future by presenting a novel 
computer model that extrapolates findings about jurors to juries, showing 
how variables of interest affect the decisions not only of individuals but also 
of deliberative bodies.  The Article demonstrates the usefulness of the model 
by applying it to data from an empirical study of the factors that influence 
juror decisions in acquaintance rape cases.  This application first elucidates 
a tension in criminal law: even if a substantial majority of jurors in a 
community would vote to convict a defendant, a majority of juries might still 
acquit.  It also demonstrates that certain legal reforms will have a 
meaningful effect in some areas of the country but not others, suggesting that 
rape law reform should occur at a local, not national, level. 
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Trial lawyers frequently need to predict the future.  “If I go to trial,” the 
attorney must ask herself, “what are my chances of winning?”  Prosecutors 
aim to maximize their conviction rates: to win frequently and to lose very 
rarely,1 so a prosecutor will charge a defendant with a crime only if he 
believes there is a high probability a jury will convict.  When a defense 
lawyer helps his client decide whether or not to accept a plea bargain, he 
engages in a complicated cost-benefit analysis, weighing the risk of 
conviction and the severity of a sentence against the prosecution’s offer.2  
Both the prosecutor and the defendant “bargain in the shadow of the jury,” 
deciding which plea offers to make and take based on the chances of a 
conviction.3  Civil litigants face similar calculations.  In deciding whether to 
sue in the first place and then whether to settle a case or proceed to trial, 
parties estimate their odds of victory in front of a jury.4  Once the lawyer gets 
to trial, she endeavors to select a jury that gives her the greatest probability of 
success; and once the jury is empaneled, she tailors her trial strategy to 
maximize her chances of getting a favorable verdict from that specific jury.5 
                                                      
1  Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away 
Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 966–69 (1997). 
2  See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: 
Making Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 
2167 (2003). 
3  See Michael A. Dawson, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the 
Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 300 (1992). 
4  See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4, 7–9 (1984). 
5  See Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers: A Study of 
the Trial Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and What, If Anything, 
To Do About It, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 441, 453–55 (1999) (discussing the work of trial 
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Lawyers have a number of tools to evaluate their likelihood of success.  
They can review the outcomes of similar cases that they have tried, observed, 
or researched and calculate the fraction won by the party in their position.6  
They can attempt an objective comparison of the evidence of the defendant’s 
wrongdoing to the legal decision standard.7  And they can predict behaviors 
of individual jurors, either by looking at studies of how prospective jurors 
might vote in a similar case or relying on their own (or their consultant’s) 
understandings of which jurors are likely to vote which way.8 
In this Article, I introduce a new tool and a new way to think about the 
probability of success: a computer simulation that uses models of individual 
juror voting to predict how a jury randomly drawn from a specified 
community will come out in a given case.  Psychologists and legal scholars 
have produced a large body of “mock-juror” studies that examine how 
variables of interest influence trial verdicts.9  But these studies rarely involve 
actual juror deliberation; more often, the researchers simply present 
individual subjects with questions about how they would vote in a particular 
case.  A program that extrapolates these results from individuals to 
deliberative bodies allows lawyers to extract new and valuable information 
from these studies: it allows them to predict the verdict of a jury drawn from 
a pool that varies with respect to the variables of interest.  If a study models 
how different types of people react to differences in case strategy, a 
deliberation simulation could predict chances of victory under different 
strategies.  
Lawyers are not the only ones who can gain useful knowledge from the 
program.  Social scientists who conduct mock-juror studies may strengthen 
their conclusions and glean new implications of their research by observing 
how findings about individuals play out in a group context.  Scholars 
frequently qualify the ecological validity of their studies by noting that 
deliberation may alter their results.10  The program mitigates that nearly 
                                                                                                                               
consultants). 
6  See Stuart S. Nagel, Lawyer Decisionmaking and Threshold Analysis, 36 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 615, 618 (1982); Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal 
Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under 
Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 673 (2006). 
7  See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment 
Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects To Test the 
PriestKlein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 461–62 (1995). 
8  But see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 76 (2001) 
(quoting Alan Dershowitz as saying, “Lawyers’ instincts are often 
the least trustworthy basis on which to pick jurors.  All those neat rules of thumb, but 
no feedback.  Ten years of accumulated experiences may be ten years of being 
wrong.”). 
9  See infra Part II.A. 
10  See, e.g., Daniel Krauss & Nicholas Scurich, The Impact of Case Factors on 
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universal concern11 and allows researchers to argue more forcefully for 
reforms based on their results.  Legislators and other policymakers 
accountable to voters will want to pass laws that achieve certain outcomes, 
including the conviction and sentencing of people who engage in conduct 
that is offensive to voters.12  Legislators, then, will be interested in drafting 
laws that not only nominally criminalize offenses in accordance with 
individual voter preference but also translate that preference into post-
deliberation jury convictions. 
Although a number of researchers have used more basic computer 
simulations to mimic deliberation and gain valuable insights into existing 
research,13 the program introduced here has several key advantages over 
earlier models.  First, I employ a recently developed, more nuanced formula 
for converting initial jury ballots into post-deliberation verdict probabilities.14  
In contrast to earlier schemes, which required the researcher to choose from 
                                                                                                                               
Jurors’ Decisions in a Sexual Violent Predator Hearing, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 135, 143 (2014); Richard L. Wiener et al., Anticipated Affect and Sentencing 
Decisions in Capital Murder, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 263, 278 (2014); David 
L. Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An 
Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 471 (2013); Emily C. 
Hodell et al., Factors Impacting Juror Perceptions of Battered Women Who Kill 
Their Abusers: Delay and Sleeping Status, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 338, 356 
(2012); Harmon M. Hosch et al., Effects of an Alibi Witness’s Relationship to the 
Defendant on Mock Jurors’ Judgments, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127, 139 (2011); 
Timothy R. Robicheaux & Brian H. Bornstein, Punished, Dead or Alive: Empirical 
Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages Against Deceased Defendants, 16 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 393, 414 (2010); Tisha R. A. Wiley & Bette L. Bottoms, 
Effects of Defendant Sexual Orientation on Jurors’ Perceptions of Child Sexual 
Assault, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 46, 57 (2009). 
11  The program does not eliminate the concern entirely. Some studies may 
involve issues where deliberation is likely to have more or less of an effect than in a 
generalized case.  See, e.g., Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 10, at 471 
(hypothesizing that deliberation might allay juror confusion). 
12  William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 530–31 (2001). 
13  See, e.g., Joseph W. Filkins et al., An Evaluation of the Biasing Effects of 
Death Qualification: A Meta-Analytic/Computer Simulation Approach, 4 THEORY & 
RES. SMALL GROUPS 153, 165–71 (2002); Scott Tindale & Dennis H. Nagao, An 
Assessment of the Potential Utility of “Scientific Jury Selection”: A “Thought 
Experiment” Approach, 37 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
409, 412–13 (1986). 
14  The model is derived from Professor Robert MacCoun’s new BOP (“balance 
of pressures” or “burden of (social) proof”) deliberation formula.  See generally 
Robert J. MacCoun, The Burden of Social Proof: Shared Thresholds and Social 
Influence, 119 PSYCH. REV. 345 (2012) (developing a deliberation framework based 
on the hypothesis that there is a shared sense of how much social opposition is 
necessary before a deliberating person should change views). 
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several rigid conversion formulas,15 the formula used herein is flexible, 
allowing the verdict probability function to vary smoothly based on factors 
such as the type of case (criminal or civil), decision rule, and jury size.  
Second, unlike earlier programs, which assumed that all jurors had an equal 
probability of voting a certain way,16 the program here more realistically 
simulates a probability for each juror individually based on that juror’s 
characteristics and the researcher’s data.  In addition, the annotated code in 
the Appendix allows scholars without a coding background to run 
deliberation simulations in Stata17  by tweaking the program to fit their data 
and question of interest. 
I demonstrate the implications of this program by applying it to a mock 
juror study of the factors that influence perception of consent in acquaintance 
rape cases where the woman claims she said “no” but there was no physical 
resistance.  I demonstrate that a “no-means-no” law—a law providing that 
the word “no” defeats a reasonable perception of consent—would have a 
more meaningful impact in some locations than in others.18  This result 
suggests that a national rape policy might not be ideal: certain states, those 
with more egalitarian values, could benefit from a “no-means-no” reform, 
while legislators in states with different cultural values should consider other 
ways of altering norms before passing this sort of law.  I also show how 
prosecutors with differing levels of knowledge about community makeup 
could determine whether a jury in their jurisdiction is likely to convict in a 
case like the one studied.  And my results offer a possible explanation for the 
low rate of prosecution in acquaintance rape cases: even if a majority of 
individuals in a community would convict, a majority of juries in that 
community may acquit. 
Part I of this paper reviews past efforts at jury deliberation models, 
discusses the deliberation framework used here, and develops a flexible 
computer program that simulates jury verdicts based on prior investigations 
of the variables that influence individual jurors.  Part II discusses the 
                                                      
15  See generally James H. Davis, Group Decision And Social Interaction: A 
Theory Of Social Decision Schemes, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 97 (1973) (introducing the 
Social Decision Scheme framework, in which the researcher chooses from a small 
set of social decision matrices that convert initial votes to a probability of each 
possible verdict). 
16  See Kwangbai Park, Estimating Juror Accuracy, Juror Ability, and the 
Relationship Between Them, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 288, 302 (2011); see also 
Filkins et al., supra note 13; Tindale & Nagao, supra note 13, at 416 (assuming 
jurors are chosen from discrete groups with certain voting probabilities). 
17  Stata is a statistical software package that provides a number of tools for data 
analysis, including multiple linear regression. See STATA: DATA ANALYSIS AND 
STATISTICAL SOFTWARE, http://www.stata.com/ [https://perma.cc/29UG-PGZA] (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
18  See infra Part III. 
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implications of this program for the many scholars who have studied mock 
jurors and the institutional actors who could benefit from their research.  
Finally, Part III demonstrates the usefulness of the program by applying it to 
research on acquaintance rape.  The Appendix includes sample code that, 
when manipulated, allows interested persons to specify community 
demographics and a model of juror voting and, given those specifications, 
estimate the likelihood of conviction in an acquaintance rape case. 
 I.  MODELING DELIBERATION 
 
 In this Part, I discuss the history of deliberation modeling and develop a 
computer program that calculates how likely a jury from a specified 
community is to find for one side in a specified case.  The model—even 
before it is applied to mock jury research—yields several interesting results.  
It reveals that in civil cases, deliberation augments the overall preference of 
the venire: if just over half of individuals would vote for the plaintiff, 
decidedly more than half of juries would do so.  In criminal cases, 
deliberation augments deviations from some larger proportion, possibly 
about two-thirds, voting for conviction: if two-thirds is the threshold, and if 
60% of individuals would initially vote for conviction, far fewer than 50% of 
juries will.  What looks like a winning case from an individual perspective, 
then, may be a losing case to the eye of an experienced prosecutor.  The 
program also shows that for close cases, deliberation exacerbates the 
differences between communities—if individuals in one community are a 
little bit more likely to convict than those in another, juries in the first 
community will be much more likely to convict than juries in the second. 
(For easy cases, deliberation mitigates the differences between communities 
in individual preference.)  In close cases, then, jury verdicts amplify the 
unique voice of the community. 
A. Efforts at Modeling Deliberation and Social Influence 
 
With the knowledge that initial ballots are a strong but imperfect 
predictor of verdicts,19 social scientists have been modeling group 
deliberation—predicting how initial votes will convert to verdicts—for 
decades.20  The most influential system for modeling group deliberation and 
                                                      
19  See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 487–90 
(1966); Diane L. Bridgeman & David Marlowe, Jury Decision Making: An 
Empirical Study Based on Actual Felony Trials, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 91, 94 
(1979); Marla Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes, Predeliberation 
Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 188 
(1995). 
20  See generally Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of 
Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622 
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decision-making, at least in the jury context, has been James H. Davis’s 1973 
Social Decision Scheme (SDS) framework.21  SDS uses a social decision 
scheme—a group’s express and implied rules of decision-making—to 
translate probabilities of individual preference arrangements into 
probabilities of final group choice.22  For example, in a “majority rules” 
social decision scheme, the probability that choice A wins over choice B is 
100% if more than half of the members prefer A, 50% if exactly half of the 
members prefer A, and 0% if fewer than half of the members prefer A.23  
Therefore, in a group of twelve people operating under a “majority rules” 
scheme, if there is a 50% chance that eight people prefer A, a 40% chance 
that six people prefer A, and a 10% chance that four people prefer A, there is 
a 70% chance overall that choice A wins. Different decision schemes result 
in different “decision matrices,” which translate individual preference 
arrangement probabilities into group probabilities.  For the social decision 
scheme “truth wins out,” if even one group member prefers choice A, and 
choice A is correct, there is a 100% chance that the group will choose A.24  
SDS research has used several such schemes with predictable decision 
matrices—including “majority rules” and “truth wins out”—as “benchmarks” 
against which to measure actual group behavior.25  
In his work, Davis suggested that researchers could use his framework in 
conjunction with data on group decision-making behavior to determine actual 
SDS matrices for decision-making bodies.26  The SDS matrix would then 
yield insight into the groups’ decision-making processes.27 Indeed, since 
Davis published his paper, researchers have used the SDS framework to 
investigate questions of courtroom procedure, such as the effect of death 
qualification on the likelihood of conviction in capital cases28 and the 
efficacy of “scientific jury selection.”29  Other researchers have expanded on 
the SDS framework in the jury context.  For example, Norbert Kerr, Robert 
MacCoun, and Geoffrey Kramer derived what MacCoun calls the Kerr 
                                                                                                                               
(2001) (providing a thorough overview of research on deliberating juries through 
1999). 
21  See Davis, supra note 15. 
22  Id. at 101. 
23  See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 357 tbl.6. 
24  See id. 
25  See id. at 353, 357 tbl.6. 
26  See Davis, supra note 15, at 114 (discussing the goal of using “all of the data, 
group and individual, to obtain an estimate of the social decision scheme matrix 
itself”). 
27  See id at 114, 123. 
28  See Filkins et al., supra note 13, at 165. 
29  See Tindale & Nagao, supra note 13, at 416. 
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Influence Model (KIM), an asymmetrical SDS matrix that accounts for 
judgmental bias.30 
While SDS and its progeny continue to be the dominant framework for 
jury deliberation,31 other models have focused on deliberation processes.  For 
example Helmutt Crott and Joachim Werner’s Norm-Information-Distance 
model32 predicts the probability an individual will transition from one choice 
to another by taking into account the “relative subgroup size for the new 
choice, the informational attractiveness of that choice, and the number of 
alternatives intermediate between the original and the new opinion.”33  It then 
translates individual transition probability into group transition probability.34  
Still other researchers have modeled jury deliberations using computer 
simulations.  In a classic paper, Steven Penrod and Reid Hastie developed 
DICE, a jury simulation program that allows users to vary several 
parameters, including jury size, decision rule, and the initial probability that a 
randomly-selected juror will initially vote to convict.35  With Nancy 
Pennington, they designed the JUS program, an advanced version of DICE 
that accommodated multiple verdict categories, including conviction of a 
lesser charge.36 
Other social psychologists have formulated influence models in settings 
more general than the group deliberation context.  Several of these models 
aim to estimate how likely it is that an individual will conform to pressure 
from an opposed group.  Bibb Latané’s Social Impact Theory derives a 
mathematical model from the established psychological premise that people 
have diminishing marginal sensitivity to stimuli.37  Brian Mullen’s Other-
Total Ratio model stems from the hypothesis that when a person’s ingroup is 
small compared to his outgroup, he will experience self-awareness, and when 
his ingroup is large compared to an outgroup, he will experience 
                                                      
30  See Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and 
Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996). 
31  Devine et al., supra note 20, at 625. 
32  See Helmutt W. Crott & Joachim Werner, The Norm-Information-Distance 
Model: A Stochastic Approach to Preference Change in Group Interaction, 30 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68 (1994).  
33  See id. at 68. 
34  Id. 
35  See Steven Penrod & Reid Hastie, A Computer Simulation of Jury Decision 
Making, 87 PSYCHOL. REV. 133, 134 (1980). 
36  See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 175–226 (1983). 
37  See Bibb Latané, The Psychology of Social Impact, 36 AM. PSYCHOL. 343, 
344 (1981).  In Latané’s model, each additional source of influence has less impact 
than the previous source; hence the decreasing marginal effect.  See also MacCoun, 
supra note 14, at 349 (discussing social impact theory). 
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deindividuation.38  And Sarah Tanford and Penrod have derived the Social 
Influence Model from their computer simulations.39 
A different group of researchers have posited logistic “social threshold 
models” for behaviors that take a binary form, where a person’s probability 
of switching behaviors changes drastically as soon as the level of an 
opposing group crosses a threshold.40  These models were not designed to 
describe deliberation: Thomas Schelling developed a “tipping point” model 
of racial segregation, where a person moves if the proportion of her 
neighbors that are of a different race crosses a certain threshold, say, 50%.41  
For convenience, he assumed in his model that all people had the same 
internal threshold.42  Mark Granovetter developed a similar tipping point 
model, but allowed thresholds to vary between people; they were either 
uniformly or normally distributed.43  He applied his model in the context of 
rioting. 
 In a recent paper, MacCoun develops a family of new social threshold 
models that can be applied to jury deliberations.44  The deliberative models 
successfully fit both the SDS “benchmarks” and the results of empirical 
studies of social influence, including mock juror studies.45 MacCoun calls 
this framework the BOP—“burden of (social) proof” or “balance of 
pressures”—framework.  He shows that a number of previous models—
including the Granovetter and Schelling threshold accounts and many of the 
classic Davis social decision schemes—can be subsumed within BOP as 
special cases.46 The BOP framework forms the basis of my computer model. 
 MacCoun begins his derivation with the well-supported social 
psychological proposition that people are sensitive to social consensus 
                                                      
38  See Brian Mullen, Operationalizing the Effect of the Group on the Individual: 
A Self-Attention Perspective, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 295–98 (1983)  
(hypothesizing that when a person’s ingroup is small relative to the outgroup, that 
person will be more likely to attempt to conform his behavior to perceived 
standards); see also MacCoun, supra note 14, at 349 (discussing Mullen’s work). 
39  See Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Social Influence Model: A Formal 
Integration of Research on Majority and Minority Influence Processes, 95 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 189, 193 (1984); see also MacCoun, supra note 14, at 349 (discussing the 
social influence model). 
40  See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 346. 
41  See Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATH. SOC. 
143, 181 (1971); see also MacCoun, supra note 14, at 361 (discussing Schelling’s 
work). 
42  See Schelling, supra note 41, at 149. 
43  Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models for Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 
1420, 1427 (1978); see also MacCoun, supra note 14, at 361 (discussing 
Granovetter’s work). 
44  See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 345, 361. 
45  Id. at 353 tbl.3, 355 fig.5, 357 tbl.6, 358 fig.6.  
46  Id. at 361. 
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information and may change positions on an issue if they are faced with 
opposing social consensus.47  While many factors, internal and external, may 
influence an actor’s decision to switch positions, MacCoun excludes these 
factors from the core of the model, stripping it down to a model solely in 
terms of social influence.48 
 Like earlier threshold models, BOP posits that each person has a 
threshold of social opposition, and once that threshold is crossed, the person 
will be much more likely to change positions.49 MacCoun labels a person’s 
net resistance to social pressure, b, for “burden of social proof,” and this 
parameter operates as an internal threshold.50  If b is 0.5, and more than 50% 
of the group is trying to change a person’s mind, that person will be likely to 
switch.51  In the group context, b can be understood as an average internal 
threshold.52 
 A second parameter, c, operates as an index of “norm clarity.”  
Mathematically, a higher c gives the s-shaped probability function a sharper 
slope (Figure 1), so that crossing the threshold has a more drastic effect on 
the probability that a person will switch positions.  MacCoun discusses two 
possible psychological interpretations of c.53  First, a low c could denote an 
internal lack of norm clarity: an individual’s resistance to social pressure may 
be uncertain or unstable.54  Second, a low c could signify variation in b 
across members of the deliberating body.55  An explicit voting standard or 
standard of proof (such as “beyond reasonable doubt”) is likely to increase c, 
because it will signal to members of the deliberating body an approximate 
value for b, the burden of social proof.56 
                                                      
47  Id. at 346. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 346–47. 
51  Id. at 346–48. 
52  Id. at 346–47. 
53  Id. at 348. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. In neural network research, a similar sigmoid function may represent 
“neural firing rate.”  As electric potential increases, the total firing rate for the neural 
network increases.  The “slope parameter,” equivalent to c in MacCoun’s model, is 
the inverse of variance in underlying neuronal states: if there is very low variance, 
the function has a sharp threshold—cross it and all of the neurons start firing.  If 
there is high variance, each increase in potential causes a few more neurons to start 
firing.  This interpretation of the slope parameter is equivalent to interpreting c as 
variance in b between group members.  See André C. Marreiros et al., Population 
Dynamics: Variance and the Sigmoid Activation Function, 42 NEUROIMAGE 147, 
149–50 (2008). 
56  See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 348. 
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 MacCoun combines his psychological premise—that people are 
responsive to social consensus—and the parameters b and c to expand from 
individuals to deliberative bodies. He derives a “bidirectional influence” 
(bBOP) model for the likelihood that one side, here labeled “Sources,” will 
win in a deliberation; the model takes the form of a logistic function:57 
 
 In the bBOP model, S is the number of sources—the number of group 
members initially voting for the Source side—and N is the total number of 
group members.58  The probability that S will win is therefore dependent on 
the proportion of group members initially voting for S, the average internal 
threshold b, and the “norm clarity” c.  The bBOP equation is depicted in 
Figure 1, with both a higher c (c = 20) and a lower c (c = 5). 
  
                                                      
57  See id. at 347 tbl.1.  For a more mathematically rigorous derivation of the 
BOP models, see id. at 347.  MacCoun also demonstrates how BOP can be derived 
from strict and random utility approaches, both of which lead to a logistic choice 
model.  Id. at 370 app. a.  Kalven and Zeisel also found that the relationship between 
first ballot votes and the likelihood of a given verdict took a somewhat sigmoid 
shape.  See Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effects of Peremptory 
Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 
STAN. L. REV. 491, 505 (1978). 



















Figure 1. MacCoun’s bBOP deliberation model when b = 0.5, with two 
different values of c.  When c is high, crossing the threshold of six jurors has 
a very sharp effect on the probability that a jury will convict. When c is low, 
the function is almost linear.59 
 
 With this bBOP model, MacCoun is able to replicate five of the most 
common SDS benchmarks perfectly or to close approximation.60  To 
replicate “majority rules”—where the initial majority is dispositive, and an 
evenly-split group is equally likely to come out either way—set b to 0.5 and 
set c to a very high value, say, 100.61  To replicate “truth wins”—where S 
wins as long as at least one person votes for it initially—keep c high but set b 
to 0.05.62  
Additionally, the model can replicate the results of several social 
influence experiments, including MacCoun’s own study of mock criminal 
juries with Norbert Kerr.63  Fitting his data to bBOP, MacCoun finds that b is 
0.62 and c is approximately 18.64  It is unsurprising that b in a criminal case 
would be greater than 0.5, because the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard 
                                                      
59  See id. at 350 fig.2.  
60  See id. at 357 tbl.6. 
61  Id.  
62  Id. 
63  Norbert L. Kerr & Robert J. MacCoun, The Effects of Jury Size and Polling 
Method on the Process and Product of Jury Deliberation, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 349, 355 tbl.2 (1985). 
64  MacCoun, supra note 14, at 353 tbl.3.  
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favors those arguing for acquittal.65  A number of studies have found this 
“asymmetry effect,”66 although some empirical work has questioned this 
leniency bias.67  MacCoun hypothesizes that this evidentiary burden of proof 
translates into a social burden of proof, because when any substantial 
minority votes to acquit, others might begin to suspect that there is, indeed, 
reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt.68 
While MacCoun’s model is founded on a sound psychological insight, 
and is backed by empirical research on group decision-making, it does have 
several limitations.  First, it does not account explicitly for several factors 
that could influence group deliberation, even given an initial vote 
distribution, most notably the size of the jury and the decision rule.  
However, by adjusting the parameters b and c, a researcher can account for 
these factors.  As noted above, to replicate the decision rule “majority rules,” 
b should be set at 0.5 and c should be set to a high value: if one side has the 
edge after the first vote, that side inevitably wins.  A criminal jury has to 
reach a unanimous decision that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.69  To replicate a jury deliberating under this higher burden of proof, b 
should be set above 0.5—the burden of social proof falls on those advocating 
conviction—and c should perhaps be set to a somewhat lower value, because 
even one holdout has a chance of persuading her fellow jurors to come over 
to her side.70  Still, c should likely not be too low, as studies of actual juries 
                                                      
65  See Robert J. MacCoun, Modeling the Impact of Extralegal Bias and Defined 
Standards of Proof on the Decisions of Mock Jurors and Juries, 46 DISSERTATION 
ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL 700B, 40 (1984). 
66  See id.; Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock 
Jury Deliberation: Jurors’ Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
21, 30 (1988). 
67  See generally Norbert L. Kerr & Robert J. MacCoun, Is the Leniency 
Asymmetry Really Dead?: Misinterpreting Asymmetry Effects in Criminal Jury 
Deliberation, 15 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 585 (2012) 
(discussing work that questions the leniency asymmetry but demonstrating some 
leniency effect, albeit one that may be less pronounced than originally believed); 
Paula L. Hannaford-Agor et al., Are Hung Juries a Problem? THE NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 67 fig.5.2 (2002), http://www.ncsc-
jurystudies.org/What-We 
Do/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/What%20We%20Do/Are%20Hung%20Juries%20
A%20Problem.ashx (showing a slight severity asymmetry). 
68  See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 354. 
69  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). 
70  See Norman Rockwell, The Holdout, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Feb. 14, 
1959, cover illustration.  “What could be a most menacing scene is saved by the 
young woman’s look.  Her defiant crossing of the arms, cool demeanor, and upright 
posture leave little doubt that while she may feel harried, it is the beseeching and 
sermonizing male jurors who are wearing down and eventually must give way to her 
will.”  SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH 
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indicate that 90% of trials produce the verdict initially favored by a 
majority,71 and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard provides an explicit 
decision rule, which might increase norm clarity. Similarly, the model does 
not account for jury-specific or case-specific factors that may influence 
deliberation systematically, such as the race and gender composition of the 
jury72 or the attractiveness of the defendant.73  Again, if we both had and 
wished to employ concrete knowledge about how jury composition affects 
deliberation, we could code the program to adjust the parameters b and c 
automatically based on the composition of an individual, simulated jury.  
The assumption in the model that group influence is directly proportional 
to relative group size may be more troublesome.  Absolute jury size does, 
indeed, affect group deliberation, with smaller juries less likely to hang.74  It 
seems likely that the parameter c might take a larger value in smaller groups, 
as it would be easier for jurors to come to a common understanding about an 
appropriate burden of social proof. 
The bBOP model also does not account directly for influence that cannot 
be predicted from demographic data, such as the presence of more persuasive 
people on the jury, individual strength of conviction, or the style of 
deliberation.75  But this does not pose a problem: like SDS, bBOP is a 
probabilistic model. These stochastic factors, unique to every jury, explain 
why one jury with ten people initially favoring conviction might acquit while 
another might convict.  bBOP tells us, overall, how many of these juries will 
go one way and how many will go the other.  
                                                                                                                               
PENALTY 59–60 (2005). 
71  See Devine et al., supra note 20, at 690. 
72  See Jonathan M. Golding et al., The Impact of Mock Jury Gender Composition 
on Deliberations and Conviction Rates in a Child Sexual Assault Trial, 12 CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 182, 185, 188 (2007); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity 
and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on 
Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 606 (2006). 
73  Richard R. Izzett & Walter Leginski, Group Discussion and the Influence of 
Defendant Characteristics in a Simulated Jury Setting, 93 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 271, 
275–76 (1974) (finding that before deliberation, mock jurors rendered a harsher 
punishment against an “unattractive” defendant, but they became more lenient after 
deliberation). 
74  See Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 63, at 359–60 (finding that smaller juries 
are less likely to hang than larger juries and that very small groups use different 
deliberation processes than larger groups); see also Devine et al., supra note 20, at 
669–70 (discussing research on jury size and deliberation). 
75  See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 143–
44 (2007) (discussing the differences between “verdict-driven” deliberation and 
“evidence-driven” deliberation); Devine et al., supra note 20, at 701 (“Clearly, the 
evidence-driven style is closer to the normative ideal desired by the courts; in 
contrast, many juries adopt the verdict-driven style that seems most likely to lead to 
the rapid delineation of factions and steadily increasing normative pressure.”). 
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Finally, the model contains only a probability of conviction and does not 
have a separate category for hung juries.76  Although only a small proportion 
of juries hang—approximately 6 percent, according to the National Center 
for State Courts77—this somewhat limits the realism of the bBOP model. 
Despite these limitations, MacCoun’s model provides a workable, 
theoretically sound, and empirically supported model of jury deliberation.  It 
incorporates the probabilistic nature of SDS research with the psychological 
insight of social threshold models, while maintaining flexibility to different 
decision rules and different distributions of internal thresholds within a 
group.  In the next Section, I incorporate the bBOP formula into a computer 
simulation that calculates the likelihood that a jury from a specified 
community will find for each side in a case. 
B. A Computer Simulation of Jury Deliberations 
 
 The heart of this paper is a new computer simulation—coded in Stata 
statistical analysis software—that uses information about what variables 
influence juror verdicts in a particular case in order to predict how likely a 
jury drawn from a specified community is to find for one side in that case.  
The Appendix contains annotated Stata code for the program when it is set 
up to calculate the likelihood that a jury will convict in an acquaintance rape 
case, where the woman said “no” but did not physically resist the defendant.  
This example is discussed in greater detail in Part III. 
 The program uses Monte Carlo simulations to produce a large sample of 
juries and have them deliberate according to the bBOP formula.  Monte 
Carlo experiments are a class of computer algorithms that investigate the 
properties of physical or mathematical systems by drawing random samples 
from a specified domain, performing calculations on each sample, and 
analyzing the results of those calculations in aggregate.78  For example, if 
you wanted to know the probability of winning a game of solitaire,79 you 
might set up a program that draws a thousand random initial distributions of 
cards, plays through each game, recording whether the game was a win or 
loss, and reports the proportion of games won.  This would be easier than 
trying to engage in a single analytic calculation of the probability of victory, 
                                                      
76  Accord Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 67, at 595 (discussing fitting a bBOP 
model after dropping hung juries). 
77  National Center for State Courts, A Profile of Hung Juries, 9 CASELOAD 
HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2003), http://www.ncsc-
jurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/What We Do/ caseload highlights hung 
juries.ashx [https://perma.cc/WN33-75LK]. 
78  See generally Nicholas Metropolis & Stanislaw Ulam, The Monte Carlo 
Method, 44 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 335 (1949) (developing the motivation for and 
description of the Monte Carlo Method). 
79  See id. at 336. 
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an intractable problem.80  Statistical simulations are useful not only for 
calculating point estimates but also for determining the confidence interval of 
an outcome.  After randomly generating 1000 outcome values that all 
represent a single unknown quantity, the program could find the 95% 
confidence interval for that quantity by ordering the outcomes lowest to 
highest and reporting the value of the 25th and 976th outcome.81 
 The program developed in this paper allows a user to simulate the 
probability that a jury will convict a defendant in a known case.  In its 
simplest form, which I call the Simple Simulation, or SimpSim, Program, it 
calculates this probability in five steps: 
1. The program specifies V, a population of jurors, or venire, with 
desired demographic characteristics (percent male, average income, 
etc.). 
2. From this venire, the program draws 12 jurors—each with his or her 
own characteristics. 
3. The program uses a user-specified statistical model to simulate an 
individual “first-ballot” verdict for each of the 12 jurors.  This 
produces an initial number of jurors, NC, that favor conviction. 
4. The program uses MacCoun’s bBOP formula82 to calculate the 
probability that a jury with NC jurors initially favoring conviction 
will, indeed, convict the defendant. 
5. The program repeats steps 2 through 5 one thousand times, to 
simulate one thousand juries.  It then averages the probabilities of 
conviction from all of these juries to find an overall probability that a 
jury drawn from V will convict. 
SimpSim requires several user specifications.  First, the user must 
specify a model that uses individual characteristics to predict how likely it is 
that a single juror will convict83 in the case.  For example, if a researcher has 
gathered data from research subjects on age, sex, political affiliation, and 
whether the subject would convict a defendant in an acquaintance rape case, 
the researcher could ask the program to run a logistic regression on her 
data—with “convict” as the left hand variable and “age,” “sex,” and 
                                                      
80  Id. 
81  See Gary King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving 
Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347, 349 (2000).  To report 
confidence intervals here, I use Stata’s “centile” function, which estimates specified 
centiles. 
82  See supra text accompanying note 57. 
83  This model can be used for either civil cases or criminal cases, and in criminal 
cases, it can output either likelihood of conviction or likelihood of acquittal.  I use 
“convict” here for convenience. 
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“political affiliation” as right hand variables—and use the regression results 
as her predictive model.  
Second, the user must specify the characteristics of the venire.  In the 
above example, the user would specify the percent of the population that is 
male, the average age and standard deviation of age, and percent of the 
population that is Republican, Democrat, Independent, or unaffiliated.  The 
user could also specify correlations between these variables, to more 
accurately represent that older people are more likely to also be registered 
Republicans, for example.84  Specifying the venire can be technically 
challenging.85 
Finally, the user should specify the parameters b and c in the bBOP 
model.  For a civil case, where the “preponderance of the evidence” standard 
gives neither side an advantage, b should be set to 0.5.  In a criminal case, 
however, where the jurors who want to convict have the burden of proof, b 
should be set at a higher value.  The precise threshold in a criminal case is 
contested.  Dennis Devine et al. suggest that in laboratory studies, acquittal is 
all but inevitable if seven jurors or fewer favor conviction, and conviction is 
highly likely if at least ten jurors favor conviction; if eight or nine jurors 
favor conviction, the case is a toss-up.86  This would mean the threshold b is 
between 0.67 and 0.75.  When MacCoun fitted his model to his own mock 
juror studies, he found that the best-fitting b was 0.62.87  Recently, Kerr and 
                                                      
84  The program, as written, does not account for jury selection and peremptory 
challenges.  If a user knew which classes of jurors would be acceptable or 
unacceptable to the lawyers in the case, he or she could alter the venire accordingly.  
Cf.  Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 57 (finding that voir dire will sometimes, but not 
always, significantly affect the jury verdict). 
85  If the user does not wish to specify correlations between variables, specifying 
the venire is easy.  For an 80% white, 20% black jury, each juror would draw a 
random number between 0 and 1.  If the number is less than 0.8, the juror is assigned 
“white.”  If it is greater than 0.8, he is assigned “black.”  This is how I have created 
venires for specified cities discussed infra—Binghamton, Bozeman, Berkeley, and 
Oxford—and for the cultural model, see infra Figure 7. 
For the remaining models, I have drawn variables from a normal distribution with 
specified means and a correlation matrix derived from a nationally-representative 
survey.  I then convert those continuous variables into categorical or binary 
variables.  The Appendix shows an example of this conversion.  In each instance, I 
have verified that the resulting population has, on average, the characteristics I 
wished to specify, by simulating large populations from the specified distribution 
and observing summary characteristics. 
86  See Devine et al., supra note 20, at 692.  Devine and his coauthors question 
the ecological validity of this leniency asymmetry, suggesting that it is insufficiently 
supported in studies of real juries.  Id. at 692–93.  Kerr and MacCoun’s reanalysis of 
real-world jury data indicates that acquittal bias still likely exists but may not be as 
strong as it is in mock juries.  See Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 67, at 599.  
87  See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 353 tbl.3. 
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MacCoun investigated this “leniency bias,” looking at recent field studies, 
and suggested it might be weaker, or at least more variable, than these studies 
suggest.88  In my own simulations of criminal cases, I use b equal to 0.67 
unless otherwise noted.89  Because this value is highly contested in the 
literature, the results of the model presented here are primarily illustrative.   
The level of norm clarity, c, in juries is also non-obvious.  Several 
factors, such as a unanimous decision rule, would counsel toward having a 
low c, while others, such as an explicit decision rule like “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” point to a high degree of clarity.  In MacCoun’s analysis 
of deliberation research, he found cs ranging from approximately 2 to 18.90  
The c for his study of mock criminal juries was at the high end of that 
range.91  Therefore, unless otherwise noted, I use a c of 18 in my own 
models.  When I discuss my findings, I will also discuss the implications of 
varying c.  
SimpSim should accurately produce a point estimate for the likelihood 
that a jury from a specified venire will convict in a certain case.  However, 
the algorithm will not accurately calculate the standard error of that estimate.  
The logistic model that, for each juror, produces a probability of initially 
voting for conviction will have some error associated with it.  If the model 
came from a regression on a small sample, or if the model for some other 
reason has uncertain regression coefficients, there is little reason to be 
confident in the point estimate it produces.  However, SimpSim uses the 
logistic model to deterministically calculate the probability of conviction for 
each juror, without attributing any error to that probability estimate.  
Therefore, the only error in the entire algorithm that will show up in the final 
point estimate will be sampling error—the error associated with drawing 
only a small sample of all possible jurors and juries from the venire.  By 
increasing the number of juries sampled, a user can shrink that error 
infinitely.  This should not be: if the regression model is poor, that error 
should emerge in the program’s output. 
An altered version of the computer program, which I will call JurySim, 
allows modeling error to show up in the standard error of the final point 
estimate.  
One way to think about the quality of a regression model is the 
uncertainty of the parameter estimates, including estimates of the regression 
                                                      
88  See Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 67, at 598.  
89  With a high c, the sigmoid function has a fairly steep slope, see infra Figure 2, 
so the probability a jury will convict is somewhat sensitive to the specific choice of 
b.  Additional research on actual criminal juries that pinpoints the precise value of b 
would greatly help the accuracy of this model. 
90  See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 353 tbl.3. 
91  See id. (noting c for Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 63).  
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coefficients.92  If uncertainty about the coefficients is low, the model reveals 
something meaningful about the relationship between the left hand variable 
and the right hand variables.  If the coefficients are very uncertain, this 
means there is a wide range of possible “true” coefficients, and we have no 
clear picture of how much the left hand variables and right hand variables 
relate.  A computer program could therefore account for modeling error if it 
accounted for coefficient uncertainty, incorporating the range of possible 
coefficients on each variable into the algorithm.  
Statistical simulation can do just this.  As noted above, simulation allows 
an analyst to estimate a 95% confidence interval by looking at the 2.5th and 
97.5th centile of results in a simulation of 1000 juries drawn from a specified 
distribution.  Instead of just drawing 1000 juries from a distribution specified 
by our chosen venire, however, we could draw 1000 models from a 
distribution specified by the coefficient estimates and variance-covariance 
matrix93 produced by a logistic regression.  Clarify, a statistical application 
designed by Harvard government professor Gary King, simulates 1000 sets 
of parameters, including regression coefficients, every time it runs a 
regression.94  By running SimpSim once on each of 1000 simulated models, 
obtaining one overall probability of conviction for each simulated model, a 
researcher could determine a 95% confidence interval for the probability 
estimate.  The 25th smallest probability estimate would form the confidence 
interval’s lower bound, and the 25th highest estimate would delineate an 
upper bound. 
Simulating 1000 juries 1000 times is unnecessarily resource intensive.  
Stata would take hours to run the program, and comparable statistical power 
can be achieved with a smaller sample.  The number of models should be 
enough to fill out the full distribution of simulated coefficients, so the model 
accounts for the full uncertainty of the regression.  The number of sampled 
juries should be enough to fairly represent the population.  The standard error 
from sampling is: 
        
Assuming an overall probability estimate of 0.5, the error attributable to 
sampling with 200 jurors per model is 3.5% for that model.  For the 40,000 
                                                      
92  Cf. King et al., supra note 81, at 348–49 (discussing types of uncertainty in 
the parameters). 
93  Id. at 349.  The variance-covariance matrix captures the extent to which the 
parameters, including the regression coefficients, vary, and also the extent to which 
they vary with each other.  
94  See Michael Tomz et al., Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting 
Statistical Results, J. STAT. SOFTWARE, June 2001, at 5–6 (2001), 
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juries produced by running 200 juries for each of 200 models,95 the sampling 
error is 0.25%.  This is very small compared to the uncertainty on the 
coefficients of nearly any regression model of human behavior and can 
usually be ignored.  The JurySim model, then, is able to produce both 
accurate point estimates and accurate confidence intervals. 
C. Generalized Results 
 
 While the most interesting results of the JurySim model come from its 
application to actual mock juror research, the SimpSim model yields useful 
general information about how differences in venires interact with the 
deliberation process.  The SimpSim model can begin to tell us under what 
circumstances deliberation will exacerbate differences between communities 
and when it might mitigate those differences.  Although much of this 
information is inherent in the logistic shape of the bBOP curve itself, 
SimpSim serves as a clarifying tool, expressing these results in a clear, 
accessible way. 
1. Civil Cases 
 
 Say we have three communities, A, B, and C, and three identical civil 
cases, say, a false advertising suit96 against a drug company.  In Community 
A, 60% of the population is initially inclined to find for the plaintiff; in B, 
70% is so inclined; and in C, 80% of jurors would find for the plaintiff.  In 
civil cases, the parameter b is set at 0.5.  The probability of conviction for a 
jury drawn from any one of these communities therefore depends only on (1) 
the proportion of the venire who would initially vote to convict, and (2) the 
value of the parameter c.97  SimpSim generates the results (Figure 2; Table 
1). 
                                                      
95  Generating 40,000 individual model-jury pairs would achieve similar result. I 
run multiple juries on a single model to highlight that modeling error and sampling 
error are distinct, and both remove precision from the estimate. 
96  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
97  This is an analytically tractable problem, so we do not actually need a 
simulation to solve it.  Using the binomial distribution and the probability that each 
juror will vote for the plaintiff, p, we can determine what proportion of juries will 
have each initial vote count—from 0-12 to 12-0.  Then, using the bBOP formula, we 
can determine, for each possible initial vote count, what proportion of juries with that 
initial vote count will ultimately find for the plaintiff.  The total proportion of the 








Figure 2. The probability that a jury will find for the plaintiff, given the 
proportion of the population initially prone to vote for the plaintiff, at two 
values of c. For both, b = 0.5. 
Community Proportion of 
Community Pro-P 
Proportion of 
Juries Pro-P  
(c = 6) 
Proportion of 
Juries Pro-P  
(c = 18) 
A 0.60 0.63 0.73 
B 0.70 0.74 0.88 
C 0.80 0.84 0.97 
Table 1. The proportion of each community that favors the plaintiff and the 
proportion of juries from each community that find for the plaintiff. 
                                                                                                                               
See Eric W. Weisstein, Binomial Distribution, in MATHWORLD—A WOLFRAM WEB 
RESOURCE, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BinomialDistribution.html 





































Figure 3. The proportion of individuals and juries that favor the plaintiff in 
each community.  
 The deliberation process slightly augments the population’s preference 
when c is 6, and it exacerbates the population’s preferences to a greater 
degree when c is 18.  When the population is disposed toward the plaintiff, as 
these three communities are, an even higher percent of juries from that 
community will find for the plaintiff.  
 More interestingly, the deliberation process sometimes augments and 
sometimes attenuates differences between communities.  We know that if the 
community is split evenly in a civil case, juries will be evenly split as well.98  
Deliberation therefore augments the difference between a 50% pro plaintiff 
community and A, a 60% pro plaintiff community, and the augmentation is 
greater when c is higher.  (In the c = 18 case, a difference of ten percentage 
points in individual preference turns into a 23 percentage point difference in 
jury preference.)  But when initial preference is far from the 50% mark, 
deliberation may mitigate differences between juries.  In the c = 18 case, a 
ten percentage point difference between individuals in communities B and C 
turns into a nine percentage point different between juries in those 
                                                      
98  Because the threshold parameter b is 0.5, juries split evenly will have a 50% 
chance of finding for the plaintiff.  The function is symmetric around this inflection 
point, so an evenly split population—where a 4-8 initial vote is just as likely as an 8-
4 initial vote—has no greater chance of producing a pro-plaintiff jury than a pro-
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communities.  And because 97% of juries in C convict, clearly the difference 
between juries in community C and juries in a community where 90% of 
individuals are pro-plaintiff cannot be greater than three percentage points. 
 Deliberation may therefore either accentuate or mitigate differences in 
population preferences depending on how close to the threshold of 50% both 
communities initially are.  Around 50%, differences are accentuated, and far 
from 50% differences are mitigated.  This means that the most divisive 
cases—those where the public is evenly split—will appear even more 
divisive if they are allowed to play out in the courtroom.  The extent to which 
they are augmented or mitigated depends on the value of c, the norm clarity 
parameter.  
2. Criminal Cases 
 
 The main structure of the bBOP model is the same for criminal cases as 
for civil.99  However, the threshold parameter b is no longer set at 0.5.  While 
the precise value of b in a civil case is disputed, it is almost certainly greater 
than 0.5 and less than 0.75.100  I set b at 0.67.  
 
 
Figure 4. The probability that a jury will convict, given the proportion of the 
population initially prone to convict, at two values of c. For both lines, b = 
0.67. 
                                                      
99  See MacCoun, supra note 14, at 354–55 (discussing social thresholds under 
both a “beyond a reasonable doubt” and a “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard). 
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 The main difference between criminal and civil cases is that in criminal 
cases, differences between communities are exacerbated to the extent the 
percentage of people in the community who would initially vote to convict is 
close to this elevated b, here 67%.  The closest cases in terms of population 
preference—those that divide the community evenly—are not the closest in 
deliberation when b exceeds 0.5.  In the c = 18 scenario, if a population is 
evenly divided on a criminal case, only 16% of juries will convict.  And 
moving from a community where 45% of individuals would initially vote to 
convict to a community where 40% would initially vote to convict brings the 
juror conviction rate down from 10.5% to 6.2%, slightly mitigating the 
difference between individual preferences in those two closely-divided 
communities. 
 Two-thirds of the community will need to favor conviction for there to 
be even a 50% chance that a jury drawn from that community will convict.  
If a prosecutor requires a much higher chance of victory before he is willing 
to risk a loss on a case, he will probably want upwards of 80% of the 
population initially favoring guilt, which will give him a comparable chance 
of winning the case at trial.  What the population at large sees as a “close 
case” can differ drastically from what a prosecutor sees as a close case.  
Prosecutors, having seen many cases, probably have a good sense of 
whether a case falls to the right of the inflection point, giving them a highly 
likely win, or to the left of the inflection point, giving them a likely loss.  
Prosecutors will likely disagree with each other only in a narrow range, right 
around the inflection point of 67 percent.  Slight shifts in the proportion of 
the venire inclined to convict translate into great differences in the overall 
probability of conviction.  
 The next Part steps away from these generalizations to examine how the 
bBOP model and JurySim could help researchers who have studied the 
effects of variables of interest on individual jurors.  But it will be useful to 
keep in mind the generalized findings of this Part: when the proportion of a 
large community that initially favors conviction is close to the bBOP 
threshold, deliberation will exacerbate differences between sub-communities; 
and while a criminal case that divides a community evenly may seem like a 
close case to the people in that community, a prosecutor is likely to recognize 
the case as a losing bet. 
 II. GETTING MORE OUT OF STUDYING INDIVIDUALS 
 
 In an ideal world, researchers interested in the factors that influence jury 
decision-making would bring full mock juries into the lab and have them 
deliberate after viewing or reading about a trial.  However, full mock jury 
studies are expensive and difficult to organize, so researchers rarely study 
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juries engaged in live deliberation.101  Instead, a large body of research has 
studied mock jurors, individual subjects who are presented with written or 
visual material and asked to make decisions about how they would vote on a 
jury.  These studies have examined juror responses to everything from the 
weight jurors afford eyewitness testimony102 to factors in corporate behavior 
that influence whether jurors in a civil case will impose punitive damages.103  
While several scholars have expressed concern about the ecological validity 
of jury simulations that do not allow for deliberation,104 researchers continue 
to examine individual mock jurors to draw conclusions about behavior that, 
in the real world, always has a deliberative component.105  
 The JurySim algorithm gives scholars a new way to understand findings 
about individual decision-makers when those individuals will actually 
deliberate before making decisions.  Although studies of jurors rely on the 
intuition that deliberative bodies from a community will mirror individuals 
from that community, JurySim breaks that intuition by demonstrating how 
juries sometimes diverge from jurors.  It allows us to extrapolate studies of 
individuals to deliberative bodies in a more realistic, telling way.  This Part 
                                                      
101  See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really 
Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1022 (2003).  But see Devine et al., supra note 20, at 627–
65 tbls.1–5 (collecting studies where mock jurors deliberated, along with studies of 
actual juries). 
102  See, e.g., Paul Skolnick & Jerry I. Shaw, A Comparison of Eyewitness and 
Physical Evidence on Mock-Juror Decisionmaking, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 614, 
621-23 (2001). 
103  See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 547, 552–59 (2000) (discussing a survey that examined whether mock jurors 
were more or less lenient on corporations that had conducted cost-benefit analysis on 
a product prior to an accident).  
104  See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is 
the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 75–76 (1999); Shari Seidman 
Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 561, 564–65 (1997). 
105  See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Truth or Doubt? An 
Empirical Test of Criminal Jury Instructions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1162–63 
(2016) (discussing lack of deliberation as a limitation but concluding that 
“having mock jurors deliberate before rendering a verdict is not likely to change the 
observed pattern of verdicts across conditions”); Casey L. Magyarics et al., The 
Impact of Frequency of Behavior and Type of Contact on Judgments Involving a 
Criminal Stalking Case, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 602, 611 (2015) (acknowledging 
this limitation and noting that Diamond, supra note 104, found “individual jurors’ 
beliefs often reflect the entire jury’s decision.”); Jeremy W. Bock, Does the 
Presumption of Validity Matter? An Experimental Assessment, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 
417, 451 (2015) (recognizing that lack of deliberation might affect the results of 
mock juror study and suggesting future work ask mock jurors to deliberate).  
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explores mock juror studies and discusses how computer simulations could 
extract useful information from existing research. 
A. How Informative Are Mock Juror Studies? 
 
In most mock juror studies, subjects do not deliberate with each other 
before deciding on a verdict—they simply express an individual 
preference.106  In The American Jury, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel report 
interviewing jurors after 225 trials and finding that, “with very few 
exceptions the first ballot decides the outcome of the verdict.”107  “And if this 
is true,” they argue, “then the real decision is often made before the 
deliberation begins.”108  MacCoun’s bBOP formula and my resulting 
computer simulations do not contradict this generalization.  If c, the 
function’s slope parameter, is high, and if b is close to 0.5, the vast majority 
of final verdicts will accord with the first ballot.  Because b is greater than 
0.5 in criminal cases, juries in which a slight majority initially favor 
conviction are likely to acquit in the end.109  
The conclusion that final verdicts usually follow first ballots means that 
we can gain useful information from learning how individuals will vote.  If 
most individuals on a jury will favor the plaintiff, given certain evidence, that 
jury, too, will likely favor the plaintiff.  Even so, mock juror studies still 
leave us with several open questions that can be answered by computer 
simulations of deliberation.  First, there is the simple question of 
extrapolating “percentage of people” to “percentage of juries.”  In a 
community where 40% of the population would initially vote for the 
plaintiff, only 34% of juries would have at least six jurors initially voting to 
convict, and less than 16% of juries would have at least seven.  In a “majority 
rules” decision scheme, then, only about 25% of juries would find for the 
plaintiff.110  Second, how much more likely is a jury to find for the plaintiff 
                                                      
106  Cf. David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 407, 432 (2013) (“Some of the mock jury experiments on evidentiary 
instructions assign the subjects to jury panels and have them deliberate before 
reaching their final decisions. But most do not.”). 
107  HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 487, 488 (1966) 
(emphasis omitted). 
108  Id. at 488 (emphasis omitted). 
109  See MacCoun & Kerr, supra note 66, at 30 (“factions favoring acquittal are 
more influential than comparably sized factions favoring conviction”).  
110  These percentages can be calculated either analytically or via computer 
simulation.  To calculate the probability that exactly six jurors will vote for the 
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when eight members initially vote that way than when seven members 
initially vote for the plaintiff?  Since juries don’t actually vote on a “majority 
rules” scheme, it is useful to know which cases have a significant chance of 
flipping during deliberation and which do not.  This is particularly relevant in 
criminal cases where “close” cases usually come out as acquittals. 
Third, and most informatively, simulations allow a researcher to define a 
complex community with specified distributions of characteristics that affect 
individual juror votes.  For a study that examines the influence of a single, 
binary variable on juror voting, it may be possible to calculate analytically 
the effect of that variable on an expected jury vote.111  For a more 
complicated study that models juror behavior based on traits that are 
distributed both within and between populations, a simulation more easily 
allows a researcher to determine how a certain case would come out in a 
specified community or how much difference a procedural intervention 
would make in a given community. 
While simulations can add information to mock juror studies, those 
studies inevitably have shortcomings unrelated to lack of deliberation, and 
these shortcomings will not be solved by computer simulation.  For example, 
one study found that when mock juries hearing a school disciplinary 
proceeding knew they were participating in a study, they behaved differently 
from mock juries who believed they actually had the power to expel a 
student.112  Other researchers have cited concerns such as the mock juror 
sample (often subjects are undergraduates), the presentation of trial evidence 
(often subjects read summaries instead of witnessing trials), and the type of 
outcome variable (often subjects report a dichotomous judgment where a 
probability-of-guilt estimate might be more informative).113  Although 
research has shown little difference between mock juror studies using 
different juror samples or trial media,114 these elements of ecological 
invalidity counsel against relying on mock juror—or even mock jury—
studies as perfect predictions of real-world behavior.  Still, by isolating the 
influence of variables of interest on mock juror verdicts, these studies allow 
us to forecast how real juror verdicts may vary across different conditions. 
                                                                                                                               
See Weisstein, supra note 97.   
111  Without Clarify’s model simulations, however, such an estimate would not 
contain an accurate confidence interval. 
112  See David L. Breau & Brian Brook, “Mock” Mock Juries: A Field Experiment 
on the Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 77, 83, 87 
(2007). 
113  See Bornstein, supra note 104, at 75–76. 
114  See id. at 88 (“few differences have been found as a function of either who the 
mock jurors are or how the mock trial is presented”). 
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B. Studies That Could Benefit from Simulation 
 
A number of studies have looked at how certain variables influence the 
likelihood that jurors will vote to convict a defendant.  One study showed 
that mock jurors weigh eyewitness testimony more than hearsay evidence.115  
The authors found that after watching a videotape of a trial, 62% of subjects 
who were presented with eyewitness testimony voted to convict, where only 
40% of subjects who heard hearsay evidence would have convicted.116  With 
circumstantial evidence alone, 36% of subjects voted to convict.117  The 
authors argued that their results may support hearsay reform.118  A similar 
study found that jurors are influenced more by physical evidence than by 
eyewitness testimony, and found that jurors were more likely to convict after 
learning of damning physical evidence (84%) than after reading about 
eyewitness testimony (67%).119  These researchers could expand their finding 
from individual jurors to juries, setting b to an appropriate value and finding 
the overall probability of conviction in their study cases under the two 
conditions.  Authors who support hearsay reform could bolster their 
recommendation by showing how in a case like the one presented, where a 
decided minority of subjects would favor conviction based on circumstantial 
evidence alone, the addition of hearsay evidence would not drastically 
change the number of juries who would convict; that number would remain 
low.  
Simulations can allow researchers to extrapolate findings of studies that 
evaluate the effects of personal characteristics of jury members, such as 
race,120 from individuals to populations with specified racial distributions.  
Samuel Sommers found that white jurors’ initial votes are influenced not 
only by their own race and the race of the defendant, but by the races of their 
fellow jurors.121  A simulation could include this effect of the racial 
                                                      
115  See Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay 
Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683, 691–92 (1992). 
116  Id.. 
117  Id. at 692. 
118 See id. at 699–700. (suggesting their findings imply that jurors generally do 
not overvalue hearsay, and while more research is needed before hearsay reforms are 
implemented, their results at least have implications for harmless error analysis).  
119  See Skolnick & Shaw, supra note 102, at 622; cf. Brian H. Bornstein et al., 
Intuitions about Arousal and Eyewitness Memory: Effects on Mock Jurors’ 
Judgments, 32 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 120 (2008) (finding that mock jurors’ 
beliefs about whether arousal helps subsequent memory retrieval interact with an 
eyewitness’s reported arousal level when they evaluate eyewitness testimony; also 
finding that a positive main effect exists for eyewitness arousal and perception of 
credibility). 
120 See, e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 101, at 1002. 
121 See id. at 1028 (discussing Samuel R. Sommers, Race and Juries: The Effects 
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composition of the jury in its prediction of individual juror first ballot votes.  
It could thereby help the researchers demonstrate how racial bias could affect 
criminal trials in different communities. 
Simulations based on the bBOP deliberation formula are not useful for 
mock juror studies without dichotomous outcomes.  MacCoun’s threshold 
model predicts only the probability that an individual will switch from one of 
two choices to the other.122  So while a number of studies have examined 
factors that affect the level of sanction jurors impose on defendants,123  
JurySim cannot predict how deliberation will act on individual appraisals of 
appropriate damages.  The next section, however, discusses a body of 
research perfectly styled to benefit from computer simulations based on 
MacCoun’s framework. 
C. JurySim and Cultural Cognition Research 
 
 While the JurySim algorithm is useful for extracting additional 
information from any mock juror study, the code is particularly useful for 
studies that investigate how variation in juror characteristics affects 
individual verdicts.  Several studies by the Cultural Cognition Project, a 
group of researchers that is based at Yale Law School, have done just this,124 
and they provide a fruitful example of how JurySim can enhance research on 
individual jurors.  These studies examine how cultural values influence juror 
fact perceptions and thereby affect juror verdicts.125 JurySim can illuminate 
how these values—and the demographic characteristics they interact with—
play out in real-world juror situations, including how jury verdicts will vary 
between communities.  These results have implications for the normative 
recommendations in cultural cognition studies. 
 “Cultural cognition” refers to the influence of individuals’ group cultural 
commitments on their factual beliefs.126  When people sit in judgment in a 
                                                                                                                               
of Race-Salience and Racial Composition on Individual and Group Decision-Making 
(2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan)). 
122  MacCoun, supra note 14, at 361. 
123 See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 103, at 556–57 (finding that mock jurors 
imposed higher damages on a corporation in a tort suit if the corporation had 
engaged in cost-benefit analysis during product design); Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury 
Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 
YALE L.J. 1775, 1776 (1999) (noting that people report a desire for harsher penalties 
in the abstract, but, when acting as mock jurors, suggest penalties below the 
recommended minimum). 
124  See infra notes 130–150, 225–263 and accompanying text. 
125  See id. 
126  See Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, 
and Why, in Acquaintance Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 732 (2010) 
(“‘Cultural cognition’ refers to the influence of group values on individuals’ 
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courtroom, they must infer facts—the events that transpired, the mental states 
of parties at various points—based on the evidence presented.  Individuals 
are psychologically motivated to conform their factual perceptions to their 
cultural values, confirming that the world works in the way they expect it 
should.127  For the same reasons that individualistic, pro-business citizens are 
less likely to believe that we are at risk from anthropogenic climate 
change,128 and people who subscribe to egalitarian values are more likely to 
believe that widespread gun possession poses a large safety risk,129  jurors’ 
perceptions of legally consequential facts will reflect their cultural 
commitments.  
A significant body of research investigates how cultural cognition 
influences juror decision-making.  In each study, researchers map subjects’ 
cultural values along two dimensions, derived from the work of 
anthropologist Mary Douglas.130  One dimension measures “hierarchy” 
versus “egalitarianism”: does the subject subscribe to a traditional social 
ordering, where a person’s social role is determined by conspicuous 
characteristics such as sex and class, or does the subject subscribe to a 
worldview that rejects distinctions in obligations and entitlements based on 
these fixed traits?131  The other dimension measures “individualism” versus 
“communitarianism”: does the person value self-sufficiency and resent 
government intervention, or does the person believe that society should both 
assist and restrict individual members in pursuit of the collective good?132   
The studies then evaluate how the subject’s positions along these two 
axes influence his or her perceptions of facts, both on their own and in 
interaction with his or her demographic characteristics and study 
manipulations.133  The research stimulus puts the subject in the role of a 
                                                                                                                               
perceptions of facts.”); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and 
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2006) (“Essentially, cultural 
commitments are prior to factual beliefs on highly charged political issues.”). 
127  Kahan, supra note 126, at 732. 
128  See Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296, 297 
(2010). 
129 See Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: 
Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
465, 481 fig.3, 505 (2007). 
130 See generally MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN 
COSMOLOGY (Routledge, 2d ed. 1996). 
131  See Kahan & Braman, supra note 126, at 153–54. 
132  See id. at 153. 
133  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism 
and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 883–84, 900 (2012) 
[hereinafter Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”] (finding values influenced whether 
subjects perceived videotaped protesters as engaging in activity that would constitute 
constitutionally protected “speech” or unprotected “conduct,” conditional on whether 
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juror,134 asking for a determination of a legally relevant fact or conclusion 
and finding cultural correlates.  Because certain demographic characteristics 
both correlate with cultural values and influence juror fact perceptions—on 
their own and in interaction with culture—computer simulations can show 
how juries are likely to come out on these cases in different communities. 
For example, one study found a correlation between cultural values and 
whether a subject, after watching a video of a police car chase, perceived that 
the fugitive—a plaintiff in a civil suit—posed such a threat to public safety 
that the police were justified in using deadly force to stop him.135  This 
investigation arose from a case in the United States Supreme Court, Scott v. 
Harris.136  Victor Harris, a motorist who fled from the police in a high-speed 
chase, had sued police officer Timothy Scott, who stopped the chase by 
ramming his vehicle into Harris’s, paralyzing Harris from the neck down.  
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, held that no reasonable jury 
could fail to find that Harris posed a serious and immediate risk to public 
safety; Scott was therefore justified in using deadly force against him.137  
Justice John Paul Stevens, in dissent, suggested that reasonable juries could 
differ about whether Harris posed a lethal threat.138  In support of the 
majority’s holding, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of posting a 
video139 to its website.  Justice Scalia wrote that the majority was “happy to 
allow the videotape to speak for itself,”140 and directed readers to the website.  
A nationally representative group of subjects viewed the video.  The 
researchers then asked the subjects whether Harris’s driving put police and 
                                                                                                                               
they were told the protest was against an abortion provider or a military recruitment 
facility); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris 
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 869–79 (2009) 
[hereinafter Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?]; Kahan, supra 
note 126, at 773–93. 
134  See, e.g., Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”, supra note 133, at 863; Kahan 
et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?, supra  note 133, at 849; Kahan, supra 
note 126, at 765. 
135  Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?, supra note 133, at 879–
80. 
136  550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
137  Id. at 380. 
138  Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
139  Videotape: Scott v. Harris (United States Supreme Court 2006), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/media/media.aspx [https://perma.cc/6KEK-TSEU].  
While Scalia’s opinion points readers to the address 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/video/scott_v_harris.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q46A-WH5C], the Court’s webmaster apparently failed to provide 
a redirect page when the Court switched to the www.supremecourt.gov 
[https://perma.cc/X6KL-SFR9] domain.   
140  Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 n.5. 
192       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 15, No. 1 
 
 
members of the public at a serious risk of death.141  Most subjects agreed 
with the Court; 73% said they at least moderately agreed with the statement, 
“During the pursuit, Harris drove in a manner that put members of the public 
at great risk of death.”142  The subjects that disagreed, however, were not 
randomly distributed throughout the population.  Instead, they were 
disproportionately African-American, female, egalitarian and 
communitarian.143 The authors drew up a profile of “Linda,” a black social 
worker from Philadelphia who is a registered Democrat and self-identified 
“liberal.”144  According to their analysis, fewer than one half of the people 
who share Linda’s characteristics would moderately or strongly agree that 
Harris posed a deadly threat.145 
The study authors criticize the court for deciding this case, in which 
different cultural groups may perceive facts in different ways, through 
summary judgment: 
 
By insisting that a case like Scott be decided summarily, the 
Court not only denied those citizens an opportunity, in the 
context of jury deliberations, to inform and possibly change 
the view of citizens endowed with a different perspective. It 
also needlessly bound the result in the case to a process of 
decision-making that deprived the decision of any prospect 
of legitimacy in the eyes of that subcommunity whose 
members saw the facts differently.146 
 
The authors recommended that judges attend to cues that a particular 
subcommunity might be outraged if judges privilege their own factual 
perceptions above those of the community.147  If a judge can conjure a mental 
image of a dissenter—that person’s race, sex, socioeconomic status, or 
political affiliation—he should evaluate his own perceptions with humility, 
and consider sending the case to a jury.148 
 My computer simulation expands on the findings of this study and 
reinforces its normative implications by showing that the deliberative process 
would likely not mitigate the polarization between white hierarchs and 
“Lindas.”  It is not clear whether any heightened differences after 
deliberation would actually increase the perception of illegitimacy, as people 
                                                      
141  Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?, supra note 133, at 857. 
142  Id. at 865 fig.2. 
143  Id. at 867. 
144  Id. at 850. 
145  Id. at 875. 
146  Id. at 841–42. 
147  Id. at 898. 
148  Id. at 898–99. 
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generally experience and voice their opinions outside of the deliberative 
context.  In other words, members of a minority group will not know how a 
jury from their own community would come out.  However, juries—
especially those comprised of members from a traditionally underrepresented 
community—perform several valuable democratic functions.  When a 
minority subcommunity makes a decision that carries the force of law, it 
contributes to the marketplace of ideas, engages in self-governance, and 
expresses its values with a rare degree of visibility.149  In other words, it 
participates in the democratic process.  By denying a jury the opportunity to 
express itself through a verdict, a judge denies the subcommunity an 
opportunity to participate in this way.   However, if the deliberative process 
strongly mitigates the differences between different communities, we might 
be less concerned about the opportunity denied, which wasn’t much of an 
opportunity at all: a jury from a majority-majority community would be 
almost as likely to find for the plaintiff as a majority-minority community. 
 But JurySim does not assuage these concerns; it may even exacerbate 
them.  Figure 5 compares juries from a majority African-American, majority 
Democrat, middle-class, majority female, northeastern community with 
juries from an overwhelmingly white, majority Republican, relatively 
wealthy, Western, community.150 
                                                      
149  See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1749 
(2005); see also Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1099, 1162 (2005).  
150  The “Pro-Defendant” Community is loosely based on Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, which is 80% white, and 51% female, where 35% of the population has a 
bachelor’s degree, and where the median household income is around $53,000.  See 
U.S. Census Bureau, Fact Sheet: Colorado Springs city, Colorado, 
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/0816000 
[https://perma.cc/7RP3-8CGK].  Registered voters in El Paso County, Colorado, are 
about two-thirds Republican.  See El Paso County: Election, 
http://car.elpasoco.com/election.  The “Pro-Plaintiff” Community is loosely based on 
Baltimore, Maryland, which is 63.4% black and 53.5% female, where 25% of the 
population has a bachelor’s degree, although 76% have graduated from high school, 
and where the median household income is around $39,000.  See U.S. Census 
Bureau, Fact Sheet: Baltimore city, Maryland, http://1.usa.gov/iroBe9.  African-
Americans may be underrepresented in the jury pool.  Baltimore, for example, draws 
its jury pool from voter registration lists and lists of statewide identity card holders, 
and disqualifies anyone who has convicted of a crime that carries a sentence of six 
months or more.  See Robert M. Bell, Order Adopting Revised Plan for Random 
Selection of Jurors in Baltimore City (2010), 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/juryservice/juryplans/baltimorecity.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9PZ5-46KF].  This selection process may disproportionately 
exclude African-American men, in particular, as they are more likely to have been 
imprisoned.  See, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook 
of Criminal Justice Statistics 2009, at tbl.6.33.2009, 
 





Figure 5.  How deliberation affects the difference between cultural 
communities in the Scott v. Harris case.  The “Pro-Plaintiff Community” is 
53% female, 60% African-American, 70% Democrat, Northeastern, and has 
an average education of some college, and an average household income of 
between $35,000 and $40,000.  The “Pro-Defendant Community” is 50% 
female, 80% white, 70% Republican, Western, and has an average education 
of some college and an average household income of between $50,000 and 
$60,000. 
Jurors from an egalitarian, African-American community are more likely 
than jurors from a hierarchical, white community to find for Harris, but more 
importantly, juries from the former community are similarly, perhaps even 
more likely to find for Harris than juries from the latter.  Indeed it is juries, 
not jurors, who would decide.  Because the coefficients on the regression 
model predicting individual votes have sizeable standard errors—we do not 
know the independent effects of different traits with a great amount of 
precision—the program yields large confidence intervals.  This is especially 
true for juries from the pro-plaintiff community: Close to 50% of individuals 
from that community would find for the plaintiff.  As we have seen, the 
logistic bBOP curve amplifies differences close to b—here, 0.5.  So small 
differences in the regression model produce large differences in the 
proportion of juries we expect will find for plaintiff.  But for most of the 
simulated models, the difference between juries in the pro-plaintiff and pro-
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defendant communities is larger than the difference between individuals in 
those communities.  If we believe the law should make room for the voices 
of these communities, the computer algorithm based on MacCoun’s model 
lends further support to the thesis from the cultural cognition paper: judges 
should maintain a degree of humility and pause before denying a jury the 
opportunity to hear a potentially culturally divisive case. 
However, the model points to a different conclusion when communities 
are polarized but both heavily disposed toward the same side (say, 1% 
favoring the plaintiff in one subcommunity and 20% favoring the plaintiff in 
another).  In both of these cases, very few juries will opt for the plaintiff.  
While a decision to take the case from the jury could still delegitimize the 
court in the eyes of the second subcommunity—a valid concern—it cannot 
realistically be understood to be taking a decision out of their hands.  This 
subcommunity would almost certainly find the same way as the court did. 
These simulations could be even more useful when applied to other 
cultural cognition studies.  In the next Part, I examine how JurySim, in 
conjunction with the Cultural Cognition Project’s study of acquaintance rape, 
can generate results useful to scholars, lawyers, and legislators. 
 III. MODELING ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: A CASE STUDY 
 
 In the prototypical case of rape, a woman walking alone at night is 
approached by a stranger with a weapon, who pulls her out of public view 
and, overcoming her determined physical resistance, forces her to have sex 
with him.151  As recent news stories about sexual assault have highlighted,152 
few actual instances of rape follow this pattern.153  In 2008, fewer than one-
third of female rape victims did not know their assailant before the attack.154  
                                                      
151  Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, A Stranger In The Bushes, Or An 
Elephant In The Room? Critical Reflections Upon Received Rape Myth Wisdom In 
The Context Of A Mock Jury Study, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 781, 782–83 (2010).  
152  See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape on and off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 2, 8 
(2015) (noting the new national conversation about non-stranger rape); see, e.g., 
Noreen Malone & Amanda Demme, ‘I’m No Longer Afraid’: 35 Women Tell Their 
Stories About Being Assaulted by Bill Cosby, and the Culture That Wouldn’t Listen, 
NEW YORK MAGAZINE (July 26, 2015), http://nymag.com/thecut/2015/07/bill-
cosbys-accusers-speak-out.html [https://perma.cc/6QRV-54PV]; Matt Hamilton, 
Former Stanford Swimmer Convicted of Sexually Assaulting Unconscious Woman on 
Campus, L.A. TIMES (March 30, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
ln-former-stanford-swimmer-convicted-sexually-assault-20160330-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/FJT5-UUH3].  
153  See Michelle J. Anderson, All-American Rape, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 625, 
625–27 (2005). 
154  MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 22777, NATIONAL CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008 5 tbl.6 (2009), 
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More commonly, the perpetrator is someone the woman knows.155  And 
sometimes the victim does not put up a forceful physical resistance, and the 
perpetrator is not carrying a physical weapon.156  When a rape follows this 
latter pattern—where the victim knows her assailant and does not forcefully 
resist—a jury may be reluctant to convict, because the jurors don’t perceive 
lack of consent.  Even though the woman said “no,” they reason, she might 
not have meant “no”; she might have communicated consent through her 
actions.157  If juries are unlikely to convict in these cases, prosecutors may be 
understandably reluctant to bring charges against perpetrators of 
acquaintance rape who encountered only verbal resistance. 
In this Part, I review the relevant scholarly discussion of the 
acquaintance rape issue158 and discuss some of the issues lawyers and 
                                                                                                                               
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL6W-4KFP].  
155  Id.  (noting that 42% of rapes were committed by a friend or acquaintance of 
the victim, and 18% were committed by an intimate partner of the victim).  In this 
paper, I limit my discussion to rape committed by men against women.  Men make 
up approximately one-fifth of rape and sexual assault victims.  Id.  However, the 
study I incorporate into my simulations addressed a case of male-on-female rape; 
therefore, any results that my simulations yield do not necessarily apply to male-on-
male or female-on-male sexual assault.  It is likely, however, that the mechanisms of 
cultural cognition would influence perceptions of consent in male-on-male rapes as 
well as in male-on-female rapes.  See, e.g., Damon Mitchell et al., Attributions of 
Victim Responsibility, Pleasure, and Trauma in Male Rape, 36 J. SEX RES. 369, 371–
72 (1999) (finding that subjects attributed more responsibility, more pleasure, and 
less trauma to a homosexual male rape victim than to a heterosexual victim). 
156  Laurie Bechhofer & Andrea Parrot, What Is Acquaintance Rape?, in 
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 9, 10 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer 
eds., 1991) 
157  See Jacquelyn W. White & John A. Humphrey, Young People’s Attitudes 
Toward Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 43, 52 
(Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991). 
158  The conversation about acquaintance rape extends far beyond what is 
addressed here.  See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal 
Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1294–1377 (1997) (focusing 
on false rape reports, the burden of proof, and victim behavior as “three pervasive 
issues” relating to leniency in acquaintance rape cases).  And academic discussion of 
rape extends far beyond acquaintance rape.  Articles within just the last few years 
have addressed topics as diverse as preventing prison rape and teaching rape law.  
See, e.g., Kim Shayo Buchanan, Engendering Rape, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1630 (2012) 
(addressing sexual abuse in prisons perpetrated by women); Helim Kathleen Chun & 
Lindsey Love, Rape, Sexual Assault & Evidentiary Matters, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 
585 (2013) (discussing rape shield laws); Jennifer M. Denbow, The Pedagogy 
of Rape Law: Objectivity, Identity and Emotion, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 16 (2014) 
(addressing teaching rape law at law schools); Corey Rayburn Yung, How To Lie 
with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197 (2014) 
(finding that many police departments undercount reported rapes). 
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legislators face when determining how to prosecute or write laws that enable 
prosecution of these cases.159  I then discuss a Cultural Cognition Project 
study of juror perceptions in acquaintance rape cases and show how the 
JurySim program can model acquaintance rape juries under a variety of 
specifications.  I derive several substantive conclusions.  First, a “no-means-
no” reform, where consent is defeated by evidence that the woman said “no,” 
is likely to make a meaningful difference in some jurisdictions and not 
others, which counsels toward local, not national reform.  Second, even in 
locations where a sizeable majority of potential jurors would convict in an 
acquaintance rape case, fewer than 50% of juries may reach the same result.  
This supports the conventional explanation for why prosecutors are unlikely 
to bring charges in these cases: they are too likely to lose. 
As an Appendix, I include the code for the JurySim algorithm.  This 
program provides a tool for prosecutors and scholars to understand how close 
acquaintance rape cases will be in different communities.  With modification, 
it can also allow legislators to determine how effective an explicit “no-
means-no” law might be in communities of interest within their state. 
A. The Conversation About Acquaintance Rape 
 
Much legal scholarship on acquaintance rape has focused on whether 
laws should be changed to define sex where a woman says “no” but does not 
physically resist as rape.160  The traditional, common law definition of rape—
which still governs in many states161—requires the defendant to have acted 
not only without the victim’s consent, but also with “force or threat of 
                                                      
159  See Leigh Bienen, Rape III — National Developments in Rape Reform 
Legislation, 6 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 170, 171 (1980) (“The articulated purposes of 
the new laws are to increase the number of rape convictions and to ensure that the 
interests of victims are respected in the criminal justice process.”).  Increasing 
prosecutions and convictions is not, however, the only goal of law reform.  For 
example, rape shield laws aim to encourage reporting and protect survivors from 
embarrassment, see Myka Held & Juliana McLaughlin, Rape & Sexual Assault, 15 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 155, 171 (2014), and the Prison Rape Elimination Act 
addresses a pervasive problem in our prisons, see Karri Iyama, “We Have Tolled the 
Bell for Him”: An Analysis of the Prison Rape Elimination Act and California's 
Compliance as It Applies to Transgender Inmates, 21 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 23, 38 
(2012).  Even during the reform movement, some suggested a lack of coherence in 
goals.  See Research into Violent Behavior: Overview and Sexual Assaults, Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and International Scientific Planning, Analysis 
and Co-operation of the Comm. on Science and Technology, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
427 (1978) (statement of Jan Ben Dor, C.S.W.), quoted in Bienen, supra, at 177. 
160  See Kahan, supra note 126, at 745–49. 
161  See Tuerkheimer, supra note 152, at 15 (“That said, a survey of rape laws 
shows that many states expressly define rape as requiring force, while others define 
rape as sex without consent but then include force as a component of non-consent.”). 
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force.”162  “Force” is defined as behavior that overcomes the physical 
resistance of the victim;163 and “threat of force” is behavior that would put a 
woman in “reasonable fear” of physical injury.164  If a woman does not 
physically resist—if she only says “no,” or otherwise verbally resists—the 
man’s actions do not formally fit under the definition of rape.  Indeed, courts 
have enforced these laws, finding that rape does not encompass sexual 
intercourse where the woman verbally expresses non-consent but does not 
physically resist.165  Also, in most jurisdictions, if the man made a 
“reasonable mistake” about the woman’s consent, he has a defense to the 
crime of rape.166 
Scholars have therefore debated whether this standard definition of 
“rape” should be changed and, if so, what would be the most effective way to 
reform rape law.  Dan Kahan categorizes these arguments into three 
positions.167  The standard feminist critique of traditional rape law says these 
laws should be changed because they originate from and perpetuate false and 
harmful sex stereotypes.168  These stereotypes hold that in normal sexual 
relationships, men are aggressors, and women, naturally ambivalent, are 
aroused by this aggression.169  Laws that reinforce these stereotypes reinforce 
male domination over women and subordinate women’s sexual autonomy.170  
Further, the mistake-of-fact defense privileges a man’s perception of consent 
over a woman’s intent to withhold it.171  The conventionalist defense of the 
common law definition of rape replies that the law reflects actual behavioral 
norms: women really do sometimes say “no” when they mean to consent.172  
Because several studies have shown that some women actually engage in 
                                                      
162  2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 17.1(a) at 605 (2d ed. 
2003). 
163  See id. § 17.14(a), at 639–40. 
164  See id. § 17.3(b), at 624–26. 
165  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164–65 (Pa. 1994). 
166  Beatrice Diehl, Note, Affirmative Consent in Sexual Assault: Prosecutors’ 
Duty, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 515–16 (2015); Douglas N. Husak & George C. 
Thomas III, Date Rape, Social Convention and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 LAW & 
PHIL. 95, 95 (1992). 
167  See Kahan, supra note 126, at 745–53.  
168  Id. at 746. 
169  See JOANNA BOURKE, RAPE: SEX, VIOLENCE, HISTORY 67–76 (2007); Kahan, 
supra note 126, at 745. 
170  See JOAN MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE? ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING 
WOMEN’S CONSENT SERIOUSLY 62–63 (2005); Kahan, supra note 126, at 747. 
171  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: 
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 653 (1983); Kahan, supra note 126, at 
747. 
172  See Husak & Thomas, supra note 166, at 122; Kahan, supra note 126, at 747–
48. 
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“token resistance,”173 it may be reasonable for a man to perceive consent in 
the face of verbal resistance.  He should not be held criminally responsible if 
he errs in this perception.174  Finally, norm-reconstructionists assert that 
while women may actually engage in token resistance, the law should 
privilege the rights of women who mean to withhold consent, and it should 
work to change the norms underlying the phenomenon of token resistance.175  
The law should insist that it is per se unreasonable to ignore a woman’s 
words.176  Legislatures should adopt a strict “no-means-no” rule.177 
Other scholars have assumed a problem with the current state of 
acquaintance rape prosecution and have argued for specific legal or 
procedural reforms.  Kahan has previously argued that juries might be more 
willing to impose civil penalties on acquaintance rapists, and the regular 
imposition of civil liability should change the norms that currently hinder 
successful acquaintance rape prosecution.178  Similarly, Katharine Baker has 
suggested that by using Title IX to treat rape as a civil wrong, the 
Department of Education may succeed in changing “the norm of male 
entitlement,”179 perhaps eventually enabling criminal enforcement.  Ian 
Ayres and Baker have suggested creating a new crime of “reckless sexual 
conduct;” a defendant would be guilty of this crime if the jury found that he 
had sexual intercourse without a condom during a first-time sexual encounter 
with a woman.180  Consent to unprotected sex would be an affirmative 
defense, but the defendant would need to prove consent by a preponderance 
of the evidence.181  Stephen Schulhofer has proposed dividing sexual abuse 
into two offenses: “rape,” which would include an element of force, and 
“sexual abuse” or “sexual misconduct,” which would cover interference with 
                                                      
173  See, e.g., Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Carie S. Rodgers, Token Resistance to 
Sex: New Perspectives on an Old Stereotype, 22 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 443, 448 tbl.1 
(1998) (Although a majority of female respondents reported engaging in token 
resistance, only 15% of women produced non-fictitious narratives that met the 
definition of token resistance). 
174  See Husak & Thomas, supra note 166, at 123–24; Kahan, supra note 126, at 
748–49. 
175  See Kahan, supra note 126, at 750. 
176  See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 102–03 (1987). 
177  Id.; see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1182 (1986). 
178  See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms 
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000). 
179  Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. 221, 222 (2015); see also Krista M. Anderson, Twelve Years Post Morrison: 
State Civil Remedies and a Proposed Government Subsidy to Incentivize Claims by 
Rape Survivors, 36 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 223, 257 (2013) (proposing that 
governments subsidize rape survivors’ civil suits). 
180  See Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 599, 599 (2005). 
181  Id. 
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a woman’s autonomy through nonviolent conduct.182  Others have argued for 
an “affirmative consent” standard.183 
Those who propose procedural reforms try to circumvent juries’ 
resistance to convict acquaintance rapists.  Donald Dripps has suggested 
instituting a juryless sex crimes court to try rape cases where the woman did 
not consent but did not physically resist.184  To comply with the Supreme 
Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, these courts could impose 
sentences of up to only six months.185  Baker has suggested that universities 
could shift social norms by imposing public shaming sanctions on 
acquaintance rapists: instead of facing jail time, college men who rape would 
be banned from team activities and forced to wear an article of clothing that 
would label them as a rapist.186  Others suggest handling rape cases through a 
process of restorative justice.187  All of these suggestions assume that juries, 
as they stand, are insufficient institutions for acquaintance rape prosecution.  
While the most innovative reforms suggested by these scholars have not 
been put into action, several states have reformed their rape laws, 
criminalizing intercourse without consent.188  Wisconsin instituted rape law 
reform in 1975 with a statute making “sexual intercourse with a person 
without the consent of that person” a felony.189  After the Berkowitz 
acquaintance rape case,190 where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a 
college student who had sex with a woman despite her verbal protestations 
could not be convicted of rape,191 Pennsylvania reformed its rape law.  The 
                                                      
182  Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and 
Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 67 (1992). 
183  See Diehl, supra note 166, at 505. 
184  See Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the 
Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957, 976 (2008). 
185  Id. 
186  See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 698 
(1999). 
187  See, e.g., Kerry M. Hodak, Note, Court Sanctioned Mediation in Cases of 
Acquaintance Rape: A Beneficial Alternative to Traditional Prosecution, 19 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1089, 1099–1101 (2004). 
188  See John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure 
of the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1083–96 (2011) (discussing “true non-
consent states” and “contradictory non-consent states,” in which the prosecution 
must show force or incapacitation to establish non-consent).  
189  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3) (West 2005); see also Christina M. Tchen, 
Comment, Rape Reform and a Statutory Consent Defense, 74 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1518, 1543 (1983).  Michigan’s pioneering and better-known 1975 
reform statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a–.5201 (West 2014), retains a 
requirement of “force or coercion.”  
190  See infra Part III.B. 
191  Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1163–64 (Pa. 1994). 
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commonwealth enacted a definition of “forcible compulsion” that includes 
“intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological force, either express or 
implied.”192  It also created a new crime, “sexual assault”: “sexual intercourse 
. . . with [another person] without [that person’s] consent.”193  While the 
penalty for sexual assault is less than the penalty for rape, it is greater than 
the penalty for “indecent assault,” the conviction Berkowitz ultimately 
received.194  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that non-consensual 
penetration satisfies the “physical force” requirement of the state’s rape 
law.195  California now requires colleges that receive state funding for 
financial aid to adopt a sexual assault policy that incorporates an “affirmative 
consent” standard.196   
Despite these reforms, however, acquittal rates are still unusually high 
for rape overall and for acquaintance rape in particular.197  Legislators who 
write rape reform laws would therefore benefit from additional information 
on what factors contribute to a law’s effectiveness in attaining convictions.198  
Prosecutors, too, will want to know the circumstances under which a trial is 
likely to result in a conviction.  When is a case really a close case, when is it 
a probable win, and when is it a sure loss?  And scholars who analyze the 
cultural factors that influence acquaintance rape law and recommend law 
reforms will be interested in the same questions: where and under what 
circumstances will a jury convict a man who had sex with a woman without 
her consent?  A recent Cultural Cognition Project study begins to answer 
these questions,199 but computer simulations of jury deliberation allow 
lawyers, legislators, and scholars to make more informed estimates about 
how these cases will play out in court.  First, I review the cultural cognition 
study.  I then run through some useful computer simulations of an 
acquaintance rape case, showing the probability that juries will convict under 
different conditions and describing who can benefit from this information. 
                                                      
192  18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 3101 (West 1972) (Supp. 2013). 
193  18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (West 1995). 
194  Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1166. 
195  See State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992). 
196  See S.B. 967, 2013-14 Sess. (Cal. 2014). 
197  Henry F. Fradella & Kegan Brown, The Effects of Using Social Scientific 
Rape Typologies on Juror Decisions to Convict, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 2 
(2007). 
198  See Bienen, supra note 159, at 171, 184. 
199  See Kahan, supra note 126. 
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B. The Berkowitz Case 
 
The Cultural Cognition Project used the facts of Berkowitz, the 
Pennsylvania case, as a stimulus for a study of what causes people to 
perceive consent in an acquaintance rape case.200  
 
1. Facts of the Case 
 
 Pennsylvania’s law reform came on the heels of a much discussed 
acquaintance rape case, Commonwealth v. Berkowitz.201  The defendant was a 
male college sophomore, Robert Berkowitz, and the complainant was a 
female sophomore at the same college who had friends in common with 
Berkowitz.202  On the afternoon of the non-consensual sex, the victim had a 
martini and went to a dormitory to meet her boyfriend, with whom she had 
argued the night before.203  Seeing that her boyfriend had not arrived, she 
went upstairs to visit her friend Earl, Berkowitz’s roommate.204 Earl wasn’t 
in the room but Berkowitz was, and they talked for a while, she sitting on the 
floor and he on the bed.205  He got off the bed, pushed the victim back, and 
began kissing her.206 She said, “Look, I gotta go. I’m going to meet [my 
boyfriend],” but he persisted.207  The victim then said “no.”208  She continued 
to say “no” and “no, I gotta go, let me go,” as he touched her breasts and 
attempted to make her perform oral sex on him.209  He got up and locked the 
door.210  Berkowitz moved the victim to the bed, removed her sweatpants, 
and had sex with her.211  After the intercourse, Berkowitz said, “Wow, I 
guess we just got carried away,” to which the victim replied, “No, we didn’t 
get carried away, you got carried away.”212  The victim left Berkowitz’s room 
and raced to her boyfriend in the dormitory lounge.213  She began crying, and 
soon after, she and her boyfriend called the police.214 
                                                      
200  See id. at 731. 
201  Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (per 
curiam), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994). 
202  Id. at 1339. 
203  Id. 
204  Id. 
205  Id. at 1339–40. 
206  Id. at 1340. 
207  Id. 
208  Id.  
209  Id. 
210  Id. 
211  Id. 
212  Id. 
213  Id. 
214  Id.  A more complete account of the incident can be found in the opinion of 
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 At trial, Berkowitz told the court that while the victim had said no, her 
actions and her tone had indicated consent, even encouragement, and he had 
stopped the intercourse as soon as he realized she was unhappy.215  The 
complainant maintained that she did not consent.216  Even though “forcible 
compulsion” was an element of rape in Pennsylvania, a jury convicted 
Berkowitz of rape and indecent assault.217  On appeal, the Superior Court 
overturned the rape conviction, saying that while the victim’s protestations 
might be sufficient to show that she did not consent, nothing in the record 
showed forcible compulsion.218  The Superior Court remanded for a new trial 
on the indecent assault conviction on evidentiary grounds.219  The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment on the rape 
conviction but reinstated the jury verdict on the indecent assault charge.220  
The decision set off a war between feminists on one side, who harshly 
criticized the court’s decision,221 and commentators who supported the 
court’s judgment.222  The legislature responded by expanding the definition 
of forcible compulsion to include “intellectual, moral, emotional or 
psychological force, either express or implied,”223 and by creating a new 
intermediate offense, “sexual assault,” defined as sexual intercourse without 
the other person’s consent.224 
2. The Cultural Cognition Study 
 
 A recent study by Dan Kahan, as part of the work of the Cultural 
Cognition Project, examined the factors that led individuals to perceive that 
Berkowitz reasonably understood the victim to be expressing consent.225  
Subjects in the study read the facts of the Berkowitz case taken from the 
                                                                                                                               
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 
215  Id. at 1341. 
216  See id. (noting appellant’s story “differed only as to the consent involved”). 
217  Id. at 1341–42.  
218  Id. at 1347–48.   
219  Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1352. 
220  See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. 1994). 
221  See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, Where Women Can’t Just Say “No,” WASH. POST, 
June 3, 1994, at A1 (quoting Cassandra Thomas, President, Nat’l Coal. Against 
Sexual Assault calling the decision “one of the worst setbacks for the sexual assault 
movement in the last several years”).  
222  Nancy E. Roman, Scales of Justice Weigh Tiers of Sexual Assault; State May 
Reform Rape Law, WASH. TIMES, June 16, 1994, at A8 (quoting Camille Paglia, 
Professor, Univ. of the Arts, as saying the case was “not even remotely about rape”).  
See Kahan, supra note 126, at 741. 
223  18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101. 
224  18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1. 
225  See Kahan, supra note 126, at 731–32, 769–71. 
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Superior Court opinion, with names changed.226  They were then presented 
with one of four legal definitions of rape—(1) the common law definition, 
(2) a strict liability definition where mistake is no defense, (3) a reform 
definition based on the Wisconsin statute, and (4) a “no-means-no” definition 
where saying “no” is sufficient to show non-consent—or no definition at 
all.227  The subjects were then asked to agree or disagree with statements, 
such as, “Despite what she said or might have felt after, Lucy really did 
consent to sexual intercourse with Dave,” and “Dave should be found guilty 
of rape.”228 
The study found that subjects who subscribed to a hierarchical 
worldview were more likely to agree that the defendant reasonably perceived 
consent, and less likely to say that the defendant should be convicted of 
rape.229  Conversely, subjects with an egalitarian worldview were more likely 
to say that the defendant could not have reasonably perceived that the victim 
had consented, and more likely to say that he was guilty of rape.230  In 
contrast with popular perception, there was no significant difference between 
how men and women, overall, perceived the case.231  Gender did, however, 
interact with both age and cultural worldview, so older, hierarchical women 
were more likely to perceive lack of consent than either younger, female 
hierarchs or older, male hierarchs.232  
Notably, the legal definition of rape presented to the subject did not 
influence whether or not that person would have found the defendant guilty, 
with one exception: the “no-means-no” condition did have a significant 
effect, with more subjects in that condition saying that the defendant should 
be convicted.233  However, culture had a substantially greater effect on 
perceptions than the “no-means-no” law.234 
Region also had a significant effect on perceptions, with northeastern and 
far western jurors more likely to convict than jurors from the south or 
mountain states.235  Although other variables that are correlated with cultural 
                                                      
226  See id. at 765. 
227  Id. at 807–12.  The study did not test every proposed definitional reform.  Cf. 
Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (2005) 
(proposing that the law “define ‘rape’ as engaging in an act of sexual penetration 
with another person when the actor fails to negotiate the penetration with the partner 
before it occurs”). 
228  Kahan supra note 126, at 812–13.  “Dave” and “Lucy” were pseudonyms used 
for the parties in the Berkowitz case. 
229  Id. at 779 tbl.1. 
230  Id.  
231  Id. at 782. 
232  Id. at 782–83. 
233  Id. at 781. 
234  Id. 
235  Id. at 779 tbl.1. 
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worldview, such as race, religion, and party affiliation, did not significantly 
affect guilt votes independently,236 they are included in some of these 
simulations to reflect any significant cumulative impact.  
C. Simulating Acquaintance Rape Juries 
 
JurySim can predict how juries will come out in cases similar to 
Berkowitz under various specified conditions.  
1. No-Means-No Law 
 
 The study found that a law explicitly stating that the word “no” defeats a 
reasonable perception of consent did have a significant effect on subjects’ 
decisions.237  But it is not immediately clear from this that such a law would 
significantly influence jury verdicts.  In terms of MacCoun’s bBOP model, if 
the community’s initial voting disposition lies far from the value of the 
threshold parameter, b, the effect of such a law might be minimal.  If a “no-
means-no” law makes jurors ten percentage points more likely to convict, 
this will hardly matter if only 10% of the community initially wanted to vote 
for conviction.  With a threshold around 67% and a relatively high c, few 
juries would convict in this community, with or without the law.  On the 
other hand, if the boost brings a community from 60% for conviction to 70% 
for conviction, it could make a large difference in the number of juries 
willing to convict.  Perhaps it could make enough of a difference that 
prosecutors would be more likely to bring these cases. 
 Say two acquaintance rapes take place on college campuses two 
thousand miles apart: one in Binghamton, New York, and the other in 
Bozeman, Montana.238  Binghamton is a small city of about 45,000 people in 
upstate New York.  It is approximately 79% white, 9% African-American, 
and 5% Latino.239  The average household income is around $47,000.240  
                                                      
236  Id. at 779 tbl.1, 782. 
237  Id. at 781. 
238  I choose these towns because they are culturally different from each other and 
because they both contain major public universities.  I do not suggest that either of 
these municipalities has a high rate of acquaintance rape. 
239 U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year 
Estimates – ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates: Binghamton city, New York, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/09_5YR/DP5YR5/1600000US0
606000%7C1600000US2854840%7C1600000US3008950%7C1600000US3606607
?slice=GEO~1600000US3606607.  The Cultural Cognition Project’s study was 
conducted in 2009, and categories such as income matched that data, so I use the 
demographic measures for these cities from that time. 
240  U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year 
Estimates – Mean Income in the Past 12 Months (In 2009 Inflation-Adjusted 
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Bozeman is a small mountain state city of about 37,000 people.  It is 
approximately 90% white, 1% black, and 2.5% Latino.241  The average 
household income is about over $58,000.242  Say the New York and Montana 
legislatures are each considering passing a “no-means-no” law in response to 
jury acquittal in these two cases.243  Will the laws work?  Will juries in these 
college towns reliably convict in cases like Berkowitz if the legislature 
reforms the law? 
 To answer this question, I simulate juries in both towns.  First, the 
simulation runs a regression on the outcome measure “guilty,” “Dave should 
be found guilty of rape.”  There are six possible outcomes for “guilty,” 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”  I therefore run an 
ordered logistic regression instead of a regression that assumes a continuous 
outcome variable.  On the right hand side, I include only variables I can 
easily determine the values for in both Binghamton and Bozeman: gender 
ratio, racial distribution,244 income, urbanicity, and region, along with a 
variable for whether there is a “no-means-no” law present.  I simulate 200 
models of this regression, and for each of those models, run 200 juries, each 
                                                                                                                               
Dollars): Binghamton city, New York, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/09_5YR/S1902/1600000US060
6000|1600000US2854840|1600000US3008950|1600000US3606607.   
241 U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year 




242  U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year 
Estimates – Mean Income in the Past 12 Months (In 2009 Inflation-Adjusted 
Dollars): Bozeman city, Montana, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/09_5YR/S1902/1600000US060
6000|1600000US2854840|1600000US3008950|1600000US3606607.   
243  New York’s statute does not say that the word “no” is sufficient to defeat 
reasonableness of consent, although it provides that lack of consent may occur when 
“the victim clearly expressed that he or she did not consent to engage in such act, and 
a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would have understood such person’s 
words and acts as an expression of lack of consent to such act under all the 
circumstances.”  See N.Y. PENAL § 130.05 (Consol. 2011).  Montana defines 
“without consent” as forcible compulsion or incapacitation.  See MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 45-5-501 (1973) (Supp. 2015). 
244  African-Americans, specifically African-American men, may be 
underrepresented on juries.  See supra note 150.  I do not adjust for this in my 
calculations, because I do not have information on whether African-Americans are 
underrepresented in this specific city, and if so, by how much.  This could, 
admittedly, pose a problem in such a sensitive model.  Ideally, someone interested in 
the results of the model would plug in the racial composition of the jury pool, not 
just the composition of the community. 
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pulled from a population distribution that mimics either Binghamton’s 
demographics or Bozeman’s, to find the overall average probability of 
conviction under four conditions: Binghamton without a law, Binghamton 
with a law, Bozeman without a law, and Bozeman with a law.  The results 
follow. 
 
Figure 6. The effect of “no-means-no” law reform on juries in Binghamton, 
New York and Bozeman, Montana.  Before deliberation, an expected 62% of 
individual Binghamton residents would have convicted, and 71% would have 
convicted after the reform.  In Bozeman,47% of individuals would have 
voted to convict before the law, and 59% would likely vote to convict after 
the law. 
 If the large confidence intervals in Figure 6 seem to suggest that the 
model cannot tell us anything useful about how juries will vote after a no-
means-no law is passed, a probability density distribution graph better 
highlights the value of the program.  Figure 7 shows the density of 

















Figure 7. Probability density distributions showing the effect of a “no-
means-no” law on juries in Binghamton and Bozeman.  
 Under the vast majority of Clarify’s simulated regression models, after a 
no-means-no law is passed, a majority of juries in Binghamton and a 
minority of juries in Bozeman would convict a defendant like Berkowitz. 
 Without a no-means-no law, even in a northeastern city like Binghamton, 
it is most likely that a minority of juries would convict.  However, after a law 
is instituted, under most simulated models, a majority would convict.  While 
a prosecutor might still be hesitant to bring charges against those odds, they 
are much better than the odds without the law reform.  In Bozeman, on the 
other hand, more juries are likely to convict with a “no-means-no” law than 
they are without one; however, the odds are fairly low under both conditions.  
Prosecutors might be very hesitant to bring this sort of case to trial in 
Bozeman. 
 This distribution hints that perhaps we should not have a national policy 
on law reform, since its effectiveness depends on the city and state where the 
charges are brought.  Instead, new laws will be most effective in places that 
are already heavily egalitarian.  State legislators should consider their 
location before passing the no-means-no law.  If the law fails, and 
acquaintance rapists are regularly acquitted, the new law will reflect poorly 
on the local government, and the effort would have used time and money 
inefficiently.  Therefore, legislators in already hierarchical states should 
consider one of the other norm reconstruction techniques—perhaps civil 
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liability or shaming sanctions—to get a state full of constituents who are 
willing to convict acquaintance rapists.  Only then should the legislature 
introduce a true “no-means-no” model.  In places more like Binghamton, 
however, this sort of law reform could be effective today. 
 Prosecutors operating under a common law definition of rape, a 
Wisconsin-style reform statute, or a “no-means-no” statute will be able to 
anticipate their cases with JurySim.  If they must have a minimal expectation 
of winning before they charge a defendant with acquaintance rape, this 
simulation could give them an idea of whether they have hit that threshold.  
Unfortunately, the error bars around JurySim’s point estimates are relatively 
large.  The simulation pulls a finite sample of juries from the community, but 
more importantly, it is based on a limited model, one that does not perfectly 
predict the likelihood that even an individual will vote for conviction.  It may 
make a very big difference to a prosecutor whether the likelihood of 
conviction is 60% or 75%, and JurySim will not be able to tell that 
prosecutor what the precise likelihood of conviction is within a percentage 
point or two.  This is an inevitable limitation of the computer program; it is 
only as precisely predictive as the underlying individual juror prediction 
model. 
2. A Cultural Model 
 
 The single most powerful influence on perceptions of consent was 
cultural worldview, with 67% of egalitarians saying that they at least 
“slightly” agreed that the defendant should be convicted of rape but only 
50% of hierarchs responding the same way.245  The cultural effect also 
interacted with respondent gender and age: only 45% of female hierarchs 
over 60 years of age agreed that the defendant should be found guilty of 
rape.246  By contrast, 52% of male hierarchs over 60 would have found the 
defendant guilty, as would have 56% of female hierarchs under 30.247  On the 
other end of the spectrum, about 76% of egalitarians under 30 years old 
agreed the defendant was guilty.248  A model that predicts a verdict based on 
culture, gender, age, and an interaction of the three is very powerful.  
Most members of the public have not taken a cultural cognition 
survey,249 and prosecutors cannot reliably plug their community’s average 
“hierarchy” score into a simulation.  However, prosecutors likely understand 
the kind of community they live in.  They have a sense of whether people in 
the community support or oppose gay marriage and affirmative action, 
                                                      
245  Kahan, supra note 126, at 776 fig.3. 
246  Id. at 776, 777 fig.4. 
247  Id. at 776, 777 fig.4. 
248  Id. at 777 fig.4. 
249  Yet. 
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whether their schools teach comprehensive sex education or abstinence only, 
whether people gripe about their taxes going to fund welfare programs or 
gripe about tax cuts going to the highest-earning Americans.  Further, jury 
consultants may perform community attitude surveys to gauge demographic 
and attitudinal distributions.250  They therefore may be able to estimate 
whether the community is more or less hierarchical than average.  If they are 
able to estimate local levels of hierarchical worldview, they could use a 
cultural worldview model.  
The figure below (Figure 8) shows the effects of deliberation on the 
probability of convicting an acquaintance rape defendant in two 
communities.  The first is, on average, one standard deviation above the 
national mean in hierarchy, has an average age of 60 years old, and is 75% 
female.  The second is, on average, one standard deviation below the national 
mean in hierarchy, has an average age of 30, and is 75% male. 
 
 
Figure 8. The effects of deliberation on an old, female, hierarchical 
community and a young, male egalitarian community. 
 Deliberation exacerbates the difference between these two groups.  
While about 50% of juries in the egalitarian group will convict, even though 
about 40% of individuals in the hierarchical group would convict, likely less 
than 10% of juries from this group agree that the defendant is guilty.  What 
seemed like a close case for individuals is not a close case when extrapolated 
to juries.  
                                                      
250  See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 5, at 452 n.30.  Consultants are 
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 This simulation also suggests, more generally, that prosecutors may be 
reluctant to bring these cases because they have an unacceptably low 
acquittal rate.  Even in an unusually—perhaps unrealistically—young and 
egalitarian community, only about half of randomly selected juries would 
convict a defendant similarly situated to Berkowitz.  This insight supports the 
conventional wisdom that prosecutors screen out “unconvictable” or even 
uncertain cases, so as not to jeopardize their conviction rates.251 
3. Full Demographic Model 
 
 A researcher with access to lots of demographic data or a prosecutor who 
is less sensitive to culture and more sensitive to these statistics, would benefit 
from a model that incorporates as many demographic characteristics as 
possible.  Variables not easily accessible from census reports, such as age 
distribution of the jury-eligible population, education level, and religious and 
political252 affiliations all may have effects on the probability that a person 
will believe the defendant should be convicted.  Many of these effects are 
insignificant when isolated, but when cultural data is unavailable, and these 
variables are appropriately correlated—a person who is Jewish is more likely 
to be white,253 for example—their insignificant effects may add up to a 
meaningful combined influence.254  
 This model could help the extremely well informed determine the 
probability of conviction in specific locations, or it could apprise scholars of 
the chances of conviction in unspecified “pro-conviction” and “pro-acquittal” 
locations.  The figure below (Figure 9), shows the difference between a 
location high in factors that counsel toward a probable conviction and a 
location high in factors that counsel toward a probable acquittal.  The Pro-
                                                      
251  See Celesta A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of 
Uncertainty, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 291, 295, 300 (1987) (theorizing that 
prosecutors seek to avoid uncertainty, and a relationship between victim and 
defendant may introduce uncertainty into prosecution); Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting 
Victims’ Allegations of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 
38 SOC. PROBS. 213, 214, 220–21 (1991) (performing an ethnographic study and 
finding that prosecutors look for “holes” in sexual assault cases and use those to 
justify case rejection). 
252  Information on voting patterns may be readily available.  However, lack of 
political affiliation is a very strong variable in these particular regressions, so 
imputing to simulated jurors the political affiliation that corresponds with their 
voting pattern might be misleading. 
253  See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PEW RESEARCH CENTER SURVEY OF U.S. JEWS, 
APP’X B 196 (2013), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/10/jewish-american-
survey-app-b-topline.pdf [https://perma.cc/38HB-YH6J]. 
254  Kahan notes that age and education have a significant combined effect.  See 
Kahan, supra note 126, at 782. 
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Conviction community is disproportionately African-American, young, 
educated, low-income, Jewish or non-religious, Democratic or Independent, 
and entirely from the Northeast.255  The Pro-Acquittal community is 
disproportionately white, old, uneducated, wealthy, Catholic or Protestant, 
Republican or politically unaffiliated, and entirely from the South.256 
 
Figure 9. The effect of deliberation on two demographically-specified 
communities: one approximately one standard deviation above the mean on 
pro-conviction variables, and the other approximately one-standard deviation 
above the mean on pro-acquittal variables. 
 The demographic model does a reasonably good job of replicating the 
cultural model, with a substantial majority of juries in the pro-conviction 
group estimated to convict and a small minority of juries in the pro-acquittal 
community convicting.  However, because the percent of individuals voting 
to convict in the pro-conviction group is so close to b, 67%, deliberation 
exacerbates small differences between the models, yielding large confidence 
                                                      
255  While both the northeast and far west are more pro-conviction than other 
regions, because I am theoretically modeling a geographic community, I choose one 
location for each run. 
This community is 43% African-American, 20% Jewish and 32% non-religious, 
57% Democrat and 31% independent, has an average age of 30.4 years, has an 
average education of between 2 and 4 years of college, and has an average annual 
income of approximately $20,000. 
256  This community is 86% white, 35% protestant, 27% Catholic, and 23% other 
Christian, 58% Republican, has an average age of 59.9 years, has an average 
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intervals.  Overall, however, this indicates that parties with good 
demographic information may be able to predict jury behavior nearly as well 
as those with only good cultural information (and information about gender 
and age). 
4. A Minimal Information Model 
 
 If neither information about a community’s cultural values nor detailed 
information about a community’s demographics is available, a prosecutor or 
other interested party can always find basic information through the U.S. 
Census website.257  This website shares, inter alia, the average household 
income, racial distribution,258 and gender distribution of any municipality in 
the country.  That information, along with the community’s geographical 
region and urbanicity, can be incorporated into a more basic model that 
predicts the proportion of juries from the community who would convict in 
an acquaintance rape case. 
 The figures below (Figures 10 & 11) show the likelihood of conviction 
for two culturally divergent college towns—Berkeley, California and Oxford, 
Mississippi—as predicted by the simple demographic model.  Berkeley is a 
relatively well-off city259 in the far west, where, at the time of this survey, 
58% percent of the population was white, 10% was African-American, 17% 
was Asian, and 10% was Latino “of any race.”260 Oxford is a less wealthy 
city261 in the south, where 73% of the population was white, 21% was 
African-American, 3% was Asian, and 2% was Latino.262 
                                                      
257  U.S. Census Bureau, Fact Sheet, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts.  
258  The census includes “Hispanic or Latino (of any race)” as a category, which 
citizens are invited to check off in addition to a “race” category such as “white” or 
“black or African-American.”  Our data, however, includes “Hispanic” as a separate 
race. These models include only non-Latino whites, African-Americans, and Asians 
in those categories. 
259  U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year 
Estimates – Mean Income in the Past 12 Months (In 2009 Inflation-Adjusted 
Dollars): Berkeley city, California, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/09_5YR/S1902/1600000US060
6000|1600000US2854840|1600000US3008950|1600000US3606607.   
260  U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year 




261 U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year 
Estimates – Mean Income in the Past 12 Months (In 2009 Inflation-Adjusted 
Dollars): Oxford city, Mississippi, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/09_5YR/S1902/1600000US060
 




Figure 10. The effect of deliberation on juries from Berkeley, California and 
Oxford, Mississippi, modeled only with data available on the U.S. Census 
website.  
                                                                                                                               
6000|1600000US2854840|1600000US3008950|1600000US3606607.   
262  U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year 



































Figure 11. Probability density distributions showing the effect of 
deliberation on juries from Berkeley and Oxford. 
As we would expect, juries in Berkeley are more likely to convict than 
juries in Oxford.  Because the model is based on relatively little information, 
however, the results could underestimate the differences between these two 
cities.  Berkeley is wealthy—a factor that, on its own, predicts acquittal—and 
Oxford is fairly racially diverse—a factor that counsels toward conviction.  
Other than the regional variable, there is little to show exactly how “liberal” 
Berkeley is.  It seems quite possible, then, that the simple model 
underestimates the likelihood of conviction in Berkeley and therefore 
underestimates both the disparity in the probability of conviction in these two 
cities and the polarizing effect over individual differences.  However, the 
simulation does reinforce the conclusion that these cases may be bad bets for 
prosecutors, even in relatively egalitarian cities.  It suggests that prosecutors 
may not bring acquaintance rape cases because of a reasonable concern that, 
even where a fair majority of the populace would support conviction, a 
majority of randomly drawn juries will not convict. 
 However, this example also demonstrates the current limits on the model 
for prosecutors: it is sensitive to slight differences in information, and 
prosecutors, determining whether or not to send a case to trial, would want a 
fairly precise estimate of the likelihood of conviction.  With a better, full-
demographic model, a prosecutor can do fairly well.  With a less substantial 
model, a prosecutor may not feel comfortable relying on the results of the 
computer program.  A prosecutor could, however, refine the model over 
216       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 15, No. 1 
 
 
time, using a machine learning algorithm263 to tweak the parameters to better 
replicate past results and predict future verdicts. 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 Lawyers, legislators, and scholars are all interested in how juries are 
likely to come out under specified conditions.  Lawyers may have strong 
intuitions based on experience with the community.  Legislators may have a 
sense of what the voters want and therefore how the public is disposed.  And 
scholars may have data on factors that influence individual jurors.  But all of 
these people could benefit from a program that extrapolates findings of 
individuals to jurors. 
 The program is far from perfect.  First, it is only as good as the model on 
which it is based and the information the user can provide.  While a cultural 
model of the acquaintance rape case produces fairly precise results, a 
prosecutor may not have precise data on the cultural distribution of her 
community; and while certain demographic data is easily available, it may 
give an impoverished picture of the community.  Second, its estimates, even 
given relatively strong models, are not perfectly precise.  A “full 
demographic model” with 200 simulated models and 200 juries per model 
provides a confidence interval of up to about thirty percentage points.  And 
while the estimates for b and c used in this paper have at least some support, 
small differences in these numbers can make significant differences in 
predicted jury verdicts.  Additional research, then, into the true values of 
these parameters would help the model’s accuracy. 
 Even though the point estimates this program produces are imprecise, the 
ranges it provides may be useful to lawyers and legislators.  And with better 
juror voting models, better model parameter estimates, and better 
descriptions of the venire of interest, the model’s estimates can become both 
more accurate and more precise.  The program also makes headway toward 
increasing the usefulness of studying individuals.  By looking at the more 
realistic deliberative situation, it begins to tell us how juror-influencing 
variables play out in the real world. 
  
                                                      
263  See, e.g., Bernard Widrow & Martin E. Hoff, Adaptive Switching Circuits, 
1960 IRE WESTERN ELECTRIC SHOW & CONVENTION RECORD, pt. 4, Aug. 23, 1960, 
at 96–104, reprinted in JAMES ANDERSON & EDWARD ROSENFELD, 
NEUROCOMPUTING: FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH 123 (1988) (developing an adaptive 
algorithm). 
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 APPENDIX: ANNOTATED SIMULATION CODE 
 
This Appendix includes annotated code for JurySim, the program that 
calculates the probability a jury will convict in an acquaintance rape case, 
contingent on the demographic characteristics of a community, as in Figure 
9.  The code is written for Stata 14 but can be adapted to other versions of the 
program.  It requires two free, user-written programs: Clarify and ice.  It 
simulates acquaintance rape juries from a pro-conviction population using 
the full demographic model but can be altered to accommodate other datasets 
and populations.  The code proceeds through the following nine steps: 
 
1. The program runs a statistical model—an ordered logistic 
regression—on the Cultural Cognition Project’s acquaintance rape 
data set, to determine the effects of a set of specified variables on the 
likelihood that an individual will vote to convict.  
2. Clarify simulates 200 versions of this model. It thereby captures the 
precision of the model within the variance of coefficients in the 
simulated models.  For each loop over steps 3 through 7, the program 
uses a different simulated model, Mi. 
3. The program specifies V, a population of jurors, or venire, with 
desired demographic characteristics (percent male, average income, 
etc.). 
4. From this venire, the program draws 12 jurors—each with his or her 
own characteristics. 
5. The program uses Mi, the simulated ordered logistic regression 
model, to simulate an individual “first-ballot” verdict for each of the 
12 jurors.  This produces an initial number of jurors, NC, that favor 
conviction. 
6. The program uses MacCoun’s bBOP formula to calculate the 
probability that a jury with NC jurors initially favoring conviction 
will, indeed, convict the defendant. 
7. The program repeats steps 3 through 6 two hundred times, to 
simulate two hundred juries.  It then averages the probabilities of 
conviction from all of these juries to find an overall probability that a 
jury drawn from V will convict using simulated model Mi. 
8. The program repeats steps 3 through 7 with another Mi.  
9. After looping through all the Mis, the program averages all of the 
probabilities of conviction, each obtained at a unique Mi.  It reports 
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** STEP 1. Running a regression on the data to derive a model 
** 
 
** Call up the acquaintance rape data set and set file 




cd "/file_location/"  
 use “date_rape_recoded.dta" 
 set more off 
drop if nmnlaw == 1 
 
** Derive a correlation matrix, showing how variables of 
interest correlate within the population. This will allow you 
to simulate more realistic jurors. For example, low-income 
jurors will be more likely to be low-education jurors. ** 
 
 corr male female white black other_minority age income educ 
urbanicity jewish protestant catholic other_christian 
non_judeochristian no_relig republican democrat independent 
no_major_party northeast midwest farwest mountain south 
 matrix cm = r(C) 
 
** Find the means of the variables. This will allow you to pull 
from a nationally-representative sample or compare a community 
to the nation as a whole.** 
 
 mean male female white black other_minority age income educ 
urbanicity jewish protestant catholic other_christian 
non_judeochristian no_relig republican democrat independent 
no_major_party northeast  midwest farwest mountain south 
 matrix m = e(b) 
 
** Find the standard errors of the variables. ** 
 
 matrix S = diag(vecdiag(e(V))) 
 matrix sddiag = cholesky(S) 
 matrix sdp = vecdiag(sddiag) 
 matrix sd = sqrt(e(N))*sdp 
 matrix minisd = .55*sd 
 
** Specify the mean values of the variables in your desired 
population. Here, I have two matrices: one for a population 
likely to convict, and another population likely to acquit. The 
national mean for each variable is next to the variable name.** 
  
 matrix mconv = (/*male 0.4787986*/.49, /*female 
0.5212014*/.51, /*%white 0.7385159*/.3, /*%black 0.1157244*/.4, 
/*other_min 0.1457597*/.3, /*age 46.30742*/30, /*income 
7.484982*/3.9, /*educ 3.35159*/4.76, /*urban 2.768551*/3, 
/*%jew 0.0159011*/.3, /*%protestant 0.2985866*/.10, /*%catholic 
0.2164311*/.1, /*%other_christ 0.1704947*/.1, /*%non_jc 
0.0865724*/.15, /*% no_relig 0.2120141*/.25, /*%repub 
0.2941696*/.2, /*%dem 0.4028269*/.55, /*%indep 0.2535336*/.4, 
/*%no_party 0.0459364*/.18, /*%northeast 0.1563604*/1, 
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/*%midwest 0.2438163*/0, /*%farwest 0.1634276*/0, /*%mountain 
0.0644876*/0, /*%south 0.3621908*/0) 
  
 matrix macq = (/*male 0.4787986*/.51, /*female 
0.5212014*/.49, /*%white 0.7385159*/.7, /*%black 
0.1157244*/.20, /*other_min 0.1457597*/.20, /*age 46.30742*/60, 
/*income 7.484982*/11, /*educ 3.35159*/2.0, /*urban 
2.768551*/2, /*%jew 0.0159011*/.1, /*%protestant 
0.2985866*/.32, /*%catholic 0.2164311*/.29, /*%other_christ 
0.1704947*/.27, /*%non_jc 0.0865724*/.1, /*% no_relig 
0.2120141*/.15, /*%repub 0.2941696*/.45, /*%dem 0.4028269*/.2, 
/*%indep 0.2535336*/.1, /*%no_party 0.0459364*/.25, 
/*%northeast 0.1563604*/0, /*%midwest 0.2438163*/0, /*%farwest 
0.1634276*/0, /*%mountain 0.0644876*/0, /*%south 0.3621908*/1)  
   
** Use multiple imputation to fill gaps in your data set. This 
will create several additional data sets with simulated values 
for absent variable observations. ** 
  
mi set mlong 
 
ice guilty male white black age income educ urbanicity 
jewish protestant catholic other_christian non_judeochristian 
republican democrat independent northeast midwest farwest 
mountain, m(5) replace cmd(guilty urbanicity educ:ologit, male 
white black jewish protestant catholic other_christian 
non_judeochristian republican democrat independent northeast 





 use fulldemog_imputed 
 gen _j= _mj  
 gen _i = _mi  
 misplit, clear 
 
** Run an ordered logit regression on the imputed data sets, 
predicting the 6-tiered variable “guilty” using specified 
demographic variables. Clarify will save 1,000 simulated models 
of this regression. ** 
 
estsimp ologit guilty male white black age income educ 
urbanicity jewish protestant catholic other_christian 
non_judeochristian republican democrat independent northeast 




** Store Clarify’s simulated models. **  
 
 estimates save ologmat, replace 
 keep b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 b10 b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 b16 
b17 b18 b19 b20 b21 b22 b23 b24 
 save clarifybs, replace 
 
** STEP 2. Choosing a Clarify model Mi. ** 




** This step formally occurs later in the code. The next 
several steps will define a program that you will run through 
200 times, each with a different Mi.** 
 
program define demogcrimo, rclass 
 version 14.1 
 drop _all 
 
** STEPS 3 and 4. Simulating jurors from a specified 
distribution. ** 
 
** Draw jurors from a normal distribution. Specify the 
demographic variables that will characterize your jurors. 
Specify the number of jurors, (currently n(12) means there are 
12 jurors), the correlation matrix between the variables 
(currently cm, the matrix you derived above), the means of each 
variable (currently set at mconv, the pro-conviction jury 
defined above), and the standard deviations of your variables 
(currently set at minisd). ** 
 
 drawnorm male female white black other_minority age income 
educ urbanicity jewish protestant catholic other_christian 
non_judeochristian no_relig republican democrat independent 
no_major_party northeast midwest farwest mountain south, n(12) 
corr(cm) means(mconv) sds(minisd) 
 
** Replace all of the normal variables with binary or 
categorical variables. This will take the variable in any 
mutually-exclusive set with the highest value and set that 
equal to 1. So if protestant = .56 and catholic = .52, this 
will change protestant to 1 and catholic to 0. This means that 
the mean of your normal distribution will not necessarily be 
the population average of the variable. You may need to play 
around with the means to replicate the desired population. The 
algorithm also reassigns the age of anyone under 18 to either 
18, 19, 20, or 21.** 
 
 gen agez = uniform() 
 replace age = 18 if age < 18 & agez < .25 
 replace age = 19 if age < 18 & agez >= .25 & agez < .50 
 replace age = 20 if age < 18 & agez >= .50 & agez < .75 
 replace age = 21 if age < 18 & agez >= .75 
replace male = 1 if male > female 
 replace male = 0 if female > male 
 replace female = 1 - male 
 replace white = 1 if white > black & white > other_minority 
 replace black = 0 if white == 1 
 replace other_minority = 0 if white == 1 
 replace black = 1 if black > white & black > other_minority 
 replace white = 0 if black == 1 
 replace other_minority = 0 if black == 1 
 replace other_minority = 1 if other_minority > black & 
other_minority > white 
 replace black = 0 if other_minority == 1 
 replace white = 0 if other_minority == 1 
 replace income = 1 if income < 1.5 
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 replace income = 2 if income > 1.5 & income < 2.5 
 replace income = 3 if income > 2.5 & income < 3.5 
 replace income = 4 if income > 3.5 & income < 4.5 
 replace income = 5 if income > 4.5 & income < 5.5 
 replace income = 6 if income > 5.5 & income < 6.5 
 replace income = 7 if income > 6.5 & income < 7.5 
 replace income = 8 if income > 7.5 & income < 8.5 
 replace income = 9 if income > 8.5 & income < 9.5 
 replace income = 10 if income > 9.5 & income < 10.5 
 replace income = 11 if income > 10.5 & income < 11.5 
 replace income = 12 if income > 11.5 & income < 12.5 
 replace income = 13 if income > 12.5 & income < 13.5 
 replace income = 14 if income > 13.5 
 
 replace educ = 1 if educ < 1.5 
 replace educ = 2 if educ > 1.5 & educ < 2.5 
 replace educ = 3 if educ > 2.5 & educ < 3.5 
 replace educ = 4 if educ > 3.5 & educ < 4.5 
 replace educ = 5 if educ > 4.5 & educ < 5.5 
 replace educ = 6 if educ > 5.5 
 replace urbanicity = 3 
 **replace urbanicity = 2 
 replace jewish = 1 if jewish > protestant & jewish > 
catholic & jewish > other_christian & jewish > 
non_judeochristian & jewish > no_relig 
 replace protestant = 0 if jewish == 1 
 replace catholic = 0 if jewish == 1 
 replace other_christian = 0 if jewish == 1 
 replace non_judeochristian = 0 if jewish == 1 
 replace no_relig = 0 if jewish == 1 
 replace protestant = 1 if protestant > jewish & protestant 
> catholic & protestant > other_christian & protestant > 
non_judeochristian & protestant > no_relig 
 replace jewish = 0 if protestant == 1 
 replace catholic = 0 if protestant == 1 
 replace other_christian = 0 if protestant == 1 
 replace non_judeochristian = 0 if protestant == 1 
 replace no_relig = 0 if protestant == 1 
 replace catholic = 1 if catholic > jewish & catholic > 
protestant & catholic > other_christian & catholic > 
non_judeochristian & catholic > no_relig 
 replace jewish = 0 if catholic == 1 
 replace protestant = 0 if catholic == 1 
 replace other_christian = 0 if catholic == 1 
 replace non_judeochristian = 0 if catholic == 1 
 replace no_relig = 0 if catholic == 1 
 replace other_christian = 1 if other_christian > jewish & 
other_christian > protestant & other_christian > catholic & 
other_christian > non_judeochristian & other_christian > 
no_relig 
 replace jewish = 0 if other_christian == 1 
 replace protestant = 0 if other_christian == 1 
 replace catholic = 0 if other_christian == 1 
 replace non_judeochristian = 0 if other_christian == 1 
 replace no_relig = 0 if other_christian == 1 
 replace non_judeochristian = 1 if non_judeochristian > 
jewish & non_judeochristian > protestant & non_judeochristian > 
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catholic & non_judeochristian > other_christian & 
non_judeochristian > no_relig 
 replace jewish = 0 if non_judeochristian == 1 
 replace protestant = 0 if non_judeochristian == 1 
 replace catholic = 0 if non_judeochristian == 1 
 replace other_christian = 0 if non_judeochristian == 1 
 replace no_relig = 0 if non_judeochristian == 1 
 replace no_relig = 1 if no_relig > jewish & no_relig > 
protestant & no_relig > catholic & no_relig > other_christian & 
no_relig > non_judeochristian 
 replace jewish = 0 if no_relig == 1 
 replace protestant = 0 if no_relig == 1 
 replace catholic = 0 if no_relig == 1 
 replace other_christian = 0 if no_relig == 1 
 replace non_judeochristian = 0 if no_relig == 1 
 replace democrat = 1 if democrat > republican & democrat > 
independent & democrat > no_major_party 
 replace republican = 0 if democrat == 1 
 replace independent = 0 if democrat == 1 
 replace no_major_party = 0 if democrat == 1 
 replace republican = 1 if republican > democrat & 
republican > independent & republican > no_major_party 
 replace democrat = 0 if republican == 1 
 replace independent = 0 if republican == 1 
 replace no_major_party = 0 if republican == 1 
 replace independent = 1 if independent > democrat & 
independent > republican & independent > no_major_party 
 replace democrat = 0 if independent == 1 
 replace republican = 0 if independent == 1 
 replace no_major_party = 0 if independent == 1 
 replace no_major_party = 1 if no_major_party > democrat & 
no_major_party > republican & no_major_party > independent 
 replace democrat = 0 if no_major_party == 1 
 replace republican = 0 if no_major_party == 1 
 replace independent = 0 if no_major_party == 1 
 replace northeast = 1 if northeast > midwest & northeast > 
farwest & northeast > mountain & northeast > south  
 replace midwest = 0 if northeast == 1 
 replace farwest = 0 if northeast == 1 
 replace mountain = 0 if northeast == 1 
 replace south = 0 if northeast == 1 
 replace midwest = 1 if midwest > northeast & midwest > 
farwest & midwest > mountain & midwest > south  
 replace northeast = 0 if midwest == 1 
 replace farwest = 0 if midwest == 1 
 replace mountain = 0 if midwest == 1 
 replace south = 0 if midwest == 1 
 replace farwest = 1 if farwest > northeast & farwest > 
midwest & farwest > mountain & farwest > south  
 replace northeast = 0 if farwest == 1 
 replace midwest = 0 if farwest == 1 
 replace mountain = 0 if farwest == 1 
 replace south = 0 if farwest == 1 
 replace mountain = 1 if mountain > northeast & mountain > 
midwest & mountain > farwest & mountain > south  
 replace northeast = 0 if mountain == 1 
 replace midwest = 0 if mountain == 1 
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 replace farwest = 0 if mountain == 1 
 replace south = 0 if mountain == 1 
 replace south = 1 if south > northeast & south > midwest & 
south > farwest & south > mountain  
 replace northeast = 0 if south == 1 
 replace midwest = 0 if south == 1 
 replace farwest = 0 if south == 1 
 replace mountain = 0 if south == 1 
 
** STEP 5. Use one of the simulated ordered logit models to 
simulate a first-ballot vote for each juror. ** 
 
** Recall the Clarify ologit estimation. ** 
 
 estimates use ologmat 
 append using clarifybs 
  
** The next several lines will include a global variable "i." 
The code loops through 200 values of “i,” one for each Mi, the 
simulated ordered logit models that Clarify generated. ** 
  
** Generate a “gscore” for each juror based on the coefficients 
in the randomly selected line of simulated parameters. This 
“gscore” is the output of the ordered logit regression in model 
Mi. ** 
 
gen gscore = b1[$i]*male + b2[$i]*white + b3[$i]*black + 
b4[$i]*age + b5[$i]*income + b6[$i]*educ + b7[$i]*urbanicity + 
b8[$i]*jewish + b9[$i]*protestant + b10[$i]*catholic + 
b11[$i]*other_christian + b12[$i]*non_judeochristian + 
b13[$i]*republican + b14[$i]*democrat + b15[$i]*independent + 
b16[$i]*northeast + b17[$i]*midwest + b18[$i]*farwest + 
b19[$i]*mountain 
  
** Generate the probability that the juror falls into each of 
the six guilt “tiers.” If the juror falls into the fourth 
through sixth tier, a vote of “guilty” will be imputed to that 
juror. These generated probabilities are based on the ordered 
logit "cuts" in Mi. ** 
 
 gen prg1 = 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b20[$i])) 
 gen prg2 = 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b21[$i])) - 1/(1 + 
exp(gscore - b20[$i])) 
 gen prg3 = 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b22[$i])) - 1/(1 + 
exp(gscore - b21[$i])) 
 gen prg4 = 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b23[$i])) - 1/(1 + 
exp(gscore - b22[$i])) 
 gen prg5 = 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b24[$i])) - 1/(1 + 
exp(gscore - b23[$i])) 
 gen prg6 = 1 - 1/(1 + exp(gscore - b24[$i]))  
  
** Pick a random number. If it is higher than the sum of the 
probabilities that the juror will fall into “guilt tiers” one 
through three, then impute an initial vote of “guilty” to that 
juror. ** 
 
 gen z = uniform() 
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 gen guilty = 0 
 replace guilty = 1 if z > (prg1 + prg2 + prg3)   
 
 keep in 1/12 
 
** Display and save the percent of jurors in the twelve person 
jury who initially vote “guilty.” ** 
 
 summarize guilty 
 return scalar igmean = r(mean) 
 





** STEPS 2 & 8. The next section loops through Mis. It defines 
a global variable “i,” which signifies the model Mi.  For each 
“i” in the loop, the program generates 200 juries, averages 
their conviction probabilities, and adds that average to a file 
containing all of the mean conviction probabilities, 
"avgprobic.dta." ** 
 
global i 13 
while $i <= 212 {   
 
** STEP 6 & 7. Simulate 200 juries and plug them into the bBOP 
formula. ** 
 
 disp `i' 
  
** Simulate 200 juries; reps(200) means 200 juries. ** 
 
 simulate igmean=r(igmean), reps(200): demogcrimo 
 gen numconvict = 12*igmean 
 gen numacquit = 12 - numconvict 
 gen pctconvict = igmean 
 gen pctacquit = 1 - igmean 
 
** Choose values for the bBOP parameters b and c. ** 
 
 gen c = 18 
 gen b = .67 
 
** Use the bBOP formula to generate a probability of 
conviction. ** 
 
 gen convprob = 1/(1 + exp(c*(b - pctconvict))) 
 
** Summarize "convprob." This will save the average conviction 
probability. ** 
 
 summarize convprob 
 clear 
 
** I call up the file with all of the average conviction 
probabilities. ** 




 use "avgprobic.dta" 
 
** Because it was based on Mi, you have produced the “ith” 
conviction probability. Store it in the “ith” cell. ** 
 
 replace avgprobic = r(mean) in $i 
 save, replace 
  
** Proceed to the next value of “i” in the loop. If you have 
just used Clarify’s eighth simulated model, you will now repeat 
all of these steps—simulating 200 juries, having them 
deliberate, finding their average probability of conviction—for 
the ninth simulated model. ** 
 
 global i = $i + 1 
} 
 





** Clear your tracks. ** 
 
program drop demogcrimo 
replace avgprobic = . 
save, replace 
 

